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ABSTRACT 
In 1985 Schotland made the observation that judicial campaigns were becoming 
“nosier, nastier, and costlier.” Because judicial campaigns are one of very few occasions 
in which individuals receive information about the bench (Schaffner and Diascro 2007), 
there is a possibility that such negativity in judicial elections could harm individual 
perceptions of the legitimacy of state supreme courts (Gibson 2008). This dissertation 
seeks to uncover the amount of negativity present in judicial campaigns, and to 
understand the effects of such negativity on perceptions of state courts’ specific and 
diffuse legitimacy.  
To accomplish this goal I first conduct a content analysis of all televised judicial 
advertisements aired from 2005-2016. While other scholars have examined the use of 
attack advertisements in judicial elections (Hall 2014), my study is the first to consider 
ads airing before and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling that removed 
spending limits for political groups. I find that neither the use of attack nor contrast 
advertisements appears to be increasing, though the sponsors of such ads have changed 
such that candidates and political parties air far fewer negative advertisements, but 
political groups air more negative ads than they did before Citizens United. 
I then conduct a unique experiment to examine the effects of negativity on 
perceptions of specific and diffuse legitimacy. Unlike previous studies, I include a 
treatment group for contrast advertisements, which are advertisements containing 
elements of negativity about a target, as well as positive information about the target’s 
opponent. I find that, perceptions of the court’s diffuse legitimacy are only moderately 
influenced by exposure to negative ads. I do however find that contrast advertisements 
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appear to depress perceptions of the court’s diffuse legitimacy by a significant amount for 
individuals with high knowledge of the courts.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Judicial Elections and Legitimacy of the Bench 
Introduction 
In 2009 the Iowa Supreme Court became the fourth judicial body to affirm the 
rights of queer Americans to marry individuals of the same biological sex when deciding 
Varnum v Brien (2009). The move was widely discussed in Iowa and throughout the 
United States as at the time very few states recognized queer marriages, and the decision 
was legally sound as it was later indirectly affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Despite the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling and 
careful legal reasoning, the citizens of Iowa began to call into question whether the Iowa 
Supreme Court was the appropriate body make such a consequential decision. In the 
months following the ruling citizens from Iowa, as well as a great number of outside 
political groups, built a campaign to remove from the bench the justices involved in the 
Varnum decision. Iowa uses a retention election system to provide for judicial 
accountability, and the following autumn three of the seven justices on the bench stood 
for retention election. All three justices lost their elections, becoming the first justices 
ever removed from the bench through the state’s retention election system, which was 
established in 1962.  
This story highlights the complicated relationships between judicial 
independence, judicial accountability, faith in the legitimacy of the courts, and the role of 
judicial elections. Outside groups are believed to have played a large part in shaping the 
content and tone of the election (Pozen 2011), with out-of-state political groups spending 
significantly more in the election than in-state actors (Schotland 2010). This raises the 
question—did the court’s ruling in Varnum inspire the public’s response, or was the 
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response a result of an expensive special interest campaign that systematically damaged 
the court’s legitimacy? It is difficult to parse out such effects post-hoc, but by 
investigating the attributes of negative campaigning and judicial legitimacy I expect to 
tease out the relationships that exist among these complicated concepts.  
In the United States, the judiciary has largely been designed as the governmental 
branch with the least practical ability to affect its own decisions due to its lack of direct 
executive and legislative functions—a feature that has been retained in both federal and 
state-level court structures, as states tend to create institutions that largely embody the 
structures of federal institutions. Scholars of the courts often argue that it is the public’s 
belief in the courts’ legitimacy that holds other branches (and the public) accountable to 
the courts’ rulings. Federal judges are appointed for life, so justices must consistently act 
in such a way to preserve legitimacy of the court due to the fact that the court’s 
legitimacy cannot be restored easily by repopulating the court. While federal courts have 
retained the lifetime appointment system, judicial selection systems in the states have 
largely transformed over the last two centuries from a majority of states using 
appointment systems to a majority of states using direct election and/or retention of 
judges after fixed terms. At the state level, however, justices are most commonly elected 
or appointed for limited terms which may allow them to act without the constraints that 
come with preserving the legitimacy of an entire institution. This move to incorporating 
systematic accountability to the electorate should theoretically boost public confidence in 
the court, but the information environment that underlies judicial selection may be 
detrimental to appraisals of state court legitimacy.  
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The information voters use to make judicial selection decisions comes almost 
exclusively from news coverage and through political campaigns.1 This project seeks to 
examine the ways in which the provision of that information through campaigning during 
judicial selection changes citizen appraisals of state courts, especially in relation to those 
courts’ legitimacy. To do this I will first examine the content of political advertisements 
run during judicial campaigns, determining the tone of televised judicial campaign 
advertisements from state supreme court elections from 2005 to 2016, as well as tracking 
the amount of money that prevalent actors use to air these ads.  
I will next use the results of the content analyses to develop an experiment to 
show the impact of negativity in campaign ads on appraisals of legitimacy. Specifically, I 
intend to show that exposure to negative advertisements creates a situation in which 
individuals are willing to update their conceptions of the court and its legitimacy. Only 
states’ highest courts, called supreme courts here, are considered in this study, as they are 
the most visible and influential courts at the state level. 
This experiment will examine the effect of judicial advertisements on citizen 
appraisals on multiple measures of legitimacy.  The first measure is specific legitimacy, a 
more transient form of legitimacy that is strongly susceptible to environmental pressures 
(Gibson and Caldeira 1992). The second is diffuse legitimacy (also known as institutional 
legitimacy), a more permanent appraisal of legitimacy that is not expected to change over 
time but may be susceptible to change in the presence of long-term negativity (Gibson 
and Caldeira 1992). The election environment may spur the updating of both forms of 
                                               
1 Although many scholars have noted that in these low-information elections, voters will 
derive information anywhere they can get it, including using cues on the ballot such as 
partisan affiliation of either judicial candidate or appointing governor. 
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legitimacy, or perhaps only specific, but given that specific legitimacy is believed to 
inform diffuse legitimacy (in some models such as Gibson 2008), both measures are 
warranted. This experiment will utilize a student to determine whether these media 
effects have a measurable impact on appraisals of legitimacy. 
Judicial Elections 
 This project will examine the highest state courts. State supreme courts are 
essential in the functioning of a state. State courts, under the purview of each state’s own 
highest court, see approximately 100 million cases per year (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
“State Court Caseload Statistics”), whereas federal courts see only about 400,000 (United 
States Courts 2017). While many of these cases are mundane and involve resolving 
questions of bureaucratic processes or disputes about specific applications of state laws, 
state courts often answer important legal questions, and they often decide cases that are 
politically charged. For example, the answer to whether states should allow same-sex-
marriage was answered at the state supreme court level in 28 states before the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard arguments, the first of these rulings occurring in Minnesota in 
1971--nearly 44 years before the Supreme Court elected to examine the same question 
(Richard John Baker v. Gerald R. Nelson 1971, Obergefell v. Hodges 2015). Legal 
resolutions of this manner are not uncommon. More important than deciding national 
questions, however, is the role of state supreme courts in interpreting state laws. In this 
regard, assuming a lack of a constitutional question, state supreme courts have the final 
say in how and whether state laws are applied—a role that is especially important in 
questions of capital punishment and other aspects of state applications of criminal justice.  
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 With such tremendous power, the way judges are selected and the effects such 
selections warrant considerable investigation.  While appointment to the bench is still 
very common, thirty-eight states currently use some form of electoral-based selection 
system for judges, either in the judges’ initial appointments, or when retaining judges. 
(See Table 1.1 for a breakdown of selection systems used.) These electoral-based systems 
include partisan or nonpartisan elections, or retention elections.2 Appointment plays an 
important role in most of these systems, however, as judges in electoral systems are most 
often appointed to the bench to fill a vacancy, and then tend to run for election at a later 
date. Whether these judicial elections are suitable for selecting justices has been widely 
debated (Geyh 2003, Dubois 1980, Bonneau and Hall 2009), and the effects of selection 
are found to vary by institution type (Bonneau and Hall 2009).  
 Figure 1.1 shows the number of judicial campaign airings by year, with 
distinctions between partisan, nonpartisan, and retention airings from 2000-2014 (in 
general election years only). The table indicates that a majority of ad airings occur in 
nonpartisan selection systems, then partisan selection, and finally retention systems. 
While many states use retention systems, campaigns in this system did not air any 
advertisements until 2010. This appears to demonstrate a relationship between selection 
system and overall airing of campaign advertisements.  
                                               
2 There are sixteen distinct systems of judicial selection used by the states, and they all 
use one of these three methods, direct appointment, or a combination of those four. In 
direct appointment the state governor, the state legislature, or a combination of both 
bodies, appoints a judge to the bench. In some cases, the judge is appointed for life, but in 
others the state governments must again nominate and reappoint the judge through the 
same channels in order to keep the judge to retain his or her seat. Some states, like New 
Jersey and Massachusetts, force justices to retire at a specific age in order to close out 
their lifetime appointment.  
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When the Founders laid out the plan for America’s court system in the late 18th 
century they focused their attention on specifying the structure and jurisdiction of the 
federal court system. States would be expected to continue using their own courts to 
adjudicate their conflicts, and the way these systems operated would be largely left to the 
states themselves. Initially after the Founding, all states maintained a system of 
appointment and approval in selecting judges for the top bench, but over time conflicts 
between the need for judicial independence and judicial accountability have led to a 
number of changes in judicial selection.3  
Partisan Elections 
The first judicial selection system of interest is partisan election. Partisan 
elections involve the direct election of judges who run as members of a political party, 
most often as a Democrat or Republican. When the state courts were founded, the public 
was given access to neither the selection of judges, nor direct accountability mechanisms 
for removing problematic judges. Reformers in the early 19th Century seized on the idea 
of unaccountability and began advocating for judicial elections, claiming publically that 
such elections would put power back in the hands of the people. However, it is now 
known that these actors sought a means of punishing Federalist-leaning justices for 
                                               
3 Judges require a certain amount of independence or isolation from the passions of the 
public in order to guarantee that level heads prevail in cases involving culturally, 
politically (ideologically), or legally salient questions. When judges face these questions, 
they should be able to answer them the way the law requires and means some separation 
from public accountability. On the other hand, the decisions that judges make are 
inherently political in that the judiciary is a governmental actor, and the decisions of the 
judiciary apply to the entire polity. When a judge is clearly beholden to special interests 
or is unwell or engaged in criminal acts the public must have a way to hold judges 
accountable. Selection systems tend to change when one of these arguments becomes 
more essential than the other. 
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practicing judicial review—a mechanism that was seen has harmful for the policy aims of 
Jeffersonian Republicans (Shugerman 2012). These initial elections were partisan in 
nature, the first of which was held in Georgia in 1812. By the late 1800s a majority of 
states used partisan elections to select their judges (Streb 2007), and today seven states 
continue to use partisan elections to select judges initially, and four states use partisan 
elections in retaining their judges. Many attributes are associated with partisan elections, 
including higher turnout, higher knowledge of candidates, and more effective matching 
of candidates to the ideology of the voter (Bonneau and Hall 2009). 
Nonpartisan Elections 
As satisfaction with the party system dissolved, the judicial selection mechanisms 
of many states changed again, this time to employ nonpartisan selection systems, the 
second selection system in use today. The first state to hold a nonpartisan judicial 
election was Washington and the election was held in 1907. By the 1940s nine states used 
nonpartisan elections to select judges, and today fifteen states continue to use nonpartisan 
elections and fifteen states use nonpartisan retention elections. In a nonpartisan election 
judges are directly accountable to the public, but judges are barred from associating with 
any political parties. This was intended to create a less political and more responsive 
judiciary, but in the fifteen states that use nonpartisan selection today voters often lack 
knowledge about the election and the candidates due to a lack of party cues (Klein and 
Baum 2001) and limited distribution of campaign messages (Sheldon and Lovrich 1999), 
and therefore tend to know less about the election (Bonneau and Hall 2009), resulting in a 
ballot roll-off effect of 4.5% based on partisan cues alone (Hall 2007). 
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Appointment Plans 
Following the Founding, all states used appointment systems to select judges for 
states’ top courts. Today twenty-eight states use appointment or indirect elections for 
initial selection of justices. Twelve of these states have continued to use strict 
appointment selection that avoids direct input from voters, while other states use a 
combination of appointment or indirect election followed by popular retention elections 
in a system known as the Missouri Plan (also known as the merit plan). 
Today twelve states use judicial selection methods that involve no direct input 
from voters. In these states judges are appointed by a state’s governor or a special 
committee or are elected by the state legislature. In three of these states (Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) appointment to the state’s supreme court is a lifetime 
appointment, but in the remaining nine states judges serve a fixed term and then are 
reappointed or re-elected by the state legislature. 
Finally, in an effort to provide high quality judges while still maintaining some 
degree of public accountability, Albert Kales proposed in 1931 a selection mechanism for 
Missouri judicial selection in which a board of lawyers and citizens proposed candidates 
for the judgeship that were then confirmed by the state government.4 This plan, often 
known as the Missouri Plan, is the third selection system of interest, and emphasizes 
merit selection of justices, with popular retention. In this plan, judges would face a 
retention election after a specific length of time (often once within the first two years, and 
then every 5-10 years). This allows citizens to remove problematic justices while still 
                                               
4 The plan was first adopted in Missouri by 1940 and is known colloquially as the 
Missouri Plan. 
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leaving the heavy lifting of selection to professionals. This selection system is currently 
used in sixteen states. It is important to note that retention systems result in very little 
turnover of justices, suggesting a low information environment. 
Each of these three selection mechanisms has distinct effects on the way that 
individuals interact with the selection process. Voters in partisan election systems tend to 
have more information about candidates and tend to vote in accordance with their 
preferences (Bonneau and Hall 2009); judges in retention systems tend to survive 
elections much easier than judges in other elections (Bonneau 2009); campaign spending 
in nonpartisan elections tends to be less efficient than in partisan elections, perhaps due to 
the lack of party cues (Bonneau and Cann 2011). As discussed extensively by Bonneau 
and Hall (2009), the variation of judicial selection mechanisms allows for a special 
examination of the impact of institutions on judicial selection. 
Thirty-eight states currently use some form of electoral selection system for 
judges. Whether these mechanisms are suitable for selecting justices has been widely 
debated, but scholars have continuously demonstrated that selection method influences a 
variety of political behaviors and outcomes.  
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is an essential attribute of the American political system, like any 
political system, but it is especially important for American courts. Unlike other branches 
of government, the courts at both the federal and state level have limited means of 
holding litigants, other governmental actors, or even other courts accountable to judicial 
decisions. While legislatures have the power to create and fund bodies to support their 
decisions, and executives have the ability to deploy actors and forces to shape their 
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decisions, the courts rely exclusively on the other two branches for support (Murphy and 
Tanenhaus 1968). The courts may make decisions with which one or both other branches 
disagree, but despite this disagreement, the executive and legislative branches contravene 
these rulings only in the rarest moments of history. Scholars believe that the reason that 
everyone—the public and other branches of government—tends to follow judicial rulings 
is due to the high levels of legitimacy the court enjoys (Easton 1965, Murphy and 
Tanenhaus 1968, Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Specifically, when the courts make a 
decision with which one branch of government disagrees, that branch must weigh the cost 
of noncompliance versus the cost of compliance. Given that the courts at all levels 
typically enjoy a high level of legitimacy, whereas the legitimacy of other institutions 
varies and is most often lower than that of the courts, defying the courts is almost too 
costly an option to consider. Legitimacy is therefore an essential tool that the courts can 
use to generate compliance.  
While legitimacy is believed to play a central role in the functioning of American 
governments, as a concept legitimacy has proven difficult to define. A governing body’s 
legitimacy is centered around the idea that the governing body is making decisions that fit 
with the expectations of the public. These expectations are diverse and vary at the 
individual level, but there is also a high degree of consistency among what individuals 
expect from government. For example, in the American case most would expect 
governmental actors to follow the guidelines and restrictions laid out in the Constitution, 
and would expect actors to be honest and fair, and to keep the public good as their highest 
priority. Individually, however, these expectations vary widely. One person may expect 
the government to create policies that keep government small and isolated, whereas her 
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neighbor may expect government to step in to social debates often and closely regulate 
many facets of the economy.  
Simply stated, legitimacy is a conception of the appropriateness of a social 
structure. That conception, as noted above, can vary from person to person, so aggregate 
measurements of legitimacy tend to provide more helpful information than individual 
appraisals of legitimacy because if enough people begin to lose faith in a governmental 
institution or actor’s legitimacy then that institution or actor may begin to lose the ability 
to do their job, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Legitimacy in the courts has generally 
been considered from two specific perspectives: the legitimacy of the institution of the 
courts, and the legitimacy of the actors driving that institution. Institutional legitimacy, 
also known as diffuse legitimacy, refers to appraisals of the legitimacy of the institution 
of the courts, such as whether the courts are the appropriate body to make certain kinds of 
legal decisions, and whether the institution should be changed in order to increase or 
reduce the amount of authority the courts have. Appraisals of diffuse legitimacy tend to 
be relatively stable as individuals tend to have a great deal of faith in the court system. 
The second form of legitimacy, which looks more at the specific actions of the court or 
the specific actors on the bench, is known as specific legitimacy. Specific legitimacy 
refers to appraisals of the court’s behavior at a specific time, or at patterns of behavior of 
specific justices. As a result, appraisals of specific legitimacy tend to be more flexible as 
individuals approve and disapprove of specific rulings of the court. Specific legitimacy is 
intimately tied to public approval but is distinct in that it does not refer to an individual’s 
approval of a judge or ruling, per se, but instead relies on the individual’s belief in 
whether the judge or her ruling are appropriate actions for the government to take (Easton 
 12 
1965, Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2003, Murphy and 
Tanenhaus 1968).  
A number of factors have been demonstrated to affect appraisals of judicial 
legitimacy. Early studies showed that a number of individual-level factors such as race, 
age, income, and knowledge of the court predicted levels of belief in the legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Caldeira and Gibson 1992), as well state supreme courts (Benesh 
2006, Cann and Yates 2008). Other research has shown that individual-level experiences 
and beliefs may be a better predictor of perspectives of legitimacy, such as expectations 
and beliefs about the role of the courts and whether the courts meet those expectations 
(Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968, Tanenhaus and Murphy 1981, Bartels, Johnson, and Mark 
2015, Bartels and Johnson 2012, Bartels and Johnson 2013, Gibson and Caldeira 2011); 
knowledge about the courts where individuals with higher knowledge see the courts as 
more legitimate (Gibson and Caldeira 2009); exposure to news coverage about the courts 
where individuals exposed to regular news reports about the courts tend to appraise the 
courts as more legitimate (Johnson and Bartels 2010); and individual agreement or 
disagreement with decisions the court makes where disagreement with a court’s decisions 
leads to lower appraisals of legitimacy (Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003).  
While these factors have largely been examined while analyzing assessments of 
federal court legitimacy, they should also apply to state level courts because the same 
causal mechanisms will still exist. Specifically, if state courts fail to meet constituent 
expectations, then constituents are likely to lose faith in the courts, such as what 
happened in Iowa’s 2010 retention elections. Knowledge about the courts is believed to 
stabilize the individuals’ expectations about court outcomes, as well as anchoring 
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appraisals of institutional legitimacy in such a way as to counteract depressions in 
appraisals of specific legitimacy over time (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Similarly, the 
public’s conceptions of state courts should also be affected by news coverage of the 
courts as this provides essential information about whether justices are behaving 
appropriately.5 Finally, rulings of state courts will affect the livelihoods of the state’s 
voters, so voters are likely to use those rulings to inform their opinions about the 
appropriateness of the courts. That is, voters are likely to see rulings with which they 
agree as more legitimate than rulings with which they do not agree.  
Unlike with the federal courts, citizens are much more likely to come into direct 
contact with state courts throughout their lives. As a result, there are a number of 
additional factors that inform opinions about legitimacy than with the federal courts. 
These include experiences individuals have had with the courts such as serving as a juror 
or defending oneself from charges (Benesh and Howell 2001, Benesh 2006), judicial 
selection system (Benesh 2006, Cann and Yates 2008), and judicial campaign factors 
such as fundraising, campaign speech, and advertising (Jamieson and Hardy 2008, 
Brandenburg and Schotland 2008, Gibson and Caldeira 2013, Gibson 2009). In the case 
of experiences with the court legitimacy is not necessarily derived from contact with the 
                                               
5 News coverage may not provide the same amount of stability in appraisals of legitimacy 
as is expected in the U.S. Supreme Court due to the fact that the rulings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court affect the entire country, whereas the effects of state supreme courts are 
limited to the borders of the state. News coverage of state supreme courts varies greatly 
based on the content of judicial rulings such as whether the rulings overturn precedent or 
change local public policy (Yanus 2009, Vining, Wilhelm, Hiers, and Marcin 2010), and 
the size and distribution of the newspaper in question (Yanus 2009, Hale 2006). It is 
important to note that while state supreme courts tend to receive less coverage than the 
U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme courts do tend to receive higher press coverage during 
judicial elections than during other times (Schaffner and Diascro 2007), which sets the 
stage for judicial elections, the primary focus of this dissertation.  
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state supreme court itself; instead the process of observing and participating in the 
procedures of lower courts has been shown to legitimize state supreme courts by 
emphasizing the role of procedure in judicial actions. That is to say, interacting with 
lower-level courts shows individuals the rigid rules and structures that ensure justice for 
citizens (Benesh 2006). In the case of judicial selection system and judicial campaigning, 
partisan selection systems have been correlated with lower appraisals of state supreme 
court legitimacy (Benesh 2006), and judicial campaign activity such as campaign speech, 
fundraising, and advertising can depress appraisals of judicial legitimacy when 
individuals begin to see the courts as being increasingly political (Gibson 2009).  
As a result of the combined objective and subjective facets of legitimacy, it has 
been conceptualized in many ways over the last half century. These varied conceptions 
tend to break legitimacy down into two groups: immediate and responsive appraisals of 
legitimacy known as specific legitimacy, and long-term legitimacy known as diffuse 
legitimacy which is seen as more stable and resilient to popular forces and more related 
to confidence in the institutions of the courts. Specific legitimacy can take into account 
the subjective expectations of citizens (such as whether the court has acted in a way that 
an individual prefers), whereas diffuse legitimacy involves understanding whether 
citizens feel that governmental entities are still the appropriate way to resolve the issues 
that they were built to face (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2003).  
Specific Legitimacy 
 Conceptions of specific legitimacy are centered on appraisals of immediate 
situations, and so they are typically centered on an individual’s perception of the events 
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surrounding the entity (such as a scandal) or the work that the entity does (such as 
successful versus failed legislative actions). This form of legitimacy is centered on the 
specific actions of actors, so appraisals of it fluctuate with general approval of the entity. 
At the state level this form of legitimacy has been measured using confidence, support, 
and approval, as well as a number of indices looking to capture its various effects 
(Benesh 2006, Gibson 2008, Cann and Wilhelm 2011). 
 Specific legitimacy is temporary and transient, and while it may spur action in the 
moment, it rarely serves as a starting point for calls for structural changes. Specific 
legitimacy is attitudinal and likely helps to inform the longer-term legitimacy of diffuse 
legitimacy (Easton 1965). Specific legitimacy focuses more on actors than institutions 
and is centered around the question as to whether or not an actor has the ability to 
appropriately and correctly govern in a specific situation, and whether the agency and its 
outputs are appropriate; this form of legitimacy can therefore be likened to political 
popularity (Wedeen 1999). One factor that is tied closely to this kind of popularity is the 
actions of the actors in question—that is, are government actors making decisions that 
comport with an individual’s preferences. This legitimacy, then, can be measured as the 
amount that individuals support an agent or that agent’s actions (Easton 1965).   
 The concept of specific legitimacy differs greatly from that of diffuse legitimacy, 
which is the more stable institutionally-based prong of legitimacy. Diffuse legitimacy is 
based not in immediate approval or disapproval of the court’s or a judicial actor’s 
behaviors or rulings but is instead centered on whether the judicial institutions in place 
are appropriate for the consolidation of power and regulation of society. Diffuse 
legitimacy is rooted in the right of the government to rule (Wedeen 1999). Because the 
 16 
institutions that Americans use to govern are generally trust their government as 
evidenced by the fact that political conversation revolves around who governmental 
actors are succeeding and failing, as opposed to conversations about whether the system 
of governance should be changed. In other words, diffuse legitimacy acts as an 
underlying reservoir of goodwill held by the public in respect to the ability of government 
to fulfill the needs of the public.  
Diffuse Legitimacy 
 Unlike specific legitimacy, diffuse legitimacy is not immediately responsive to 
actions of the court that go against the preferences of respondents. In fact, in individuals 
may appraise the specific legitimacy of the courts as low, but still report having high 
levels of esteem for the courts (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2003). This is possible 
because an individual may have great confidence in the appropriateness of institutions of 
the government but may feel that specific actors within those institutions are problematic 
forces within the institutions.   
 Legitimacy of the courts has been a topic of debate for several decades in political 
science. Unlike other governmental institutions, the courts receive persistently high 
appraisals of legitimacy-both diffuse and specific. Diffuse legitimacy of the courts allows 
individuals to overlook rulings with which they disagree to remain steadfast in the belief 
that the institutions that undergird the legal system are appropriate and sufficient (Gibson 
and Caldeira 2009 “confirmation”) and believe in compliance to decisions with which 
they disagree (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005). Specific legitimacy tends to move 
more steadily, especially as individual expectations about the court are met or fail to be 
met. In other words, when the court rules in such a way that is contrary to a person’s 
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expectations, they tend to have a lower appraisal of the court’s specific legitimacy until 
they either forget, or until the court rules in such a way that their expectations are met. 
The diffuse legitimacy of state supreme courts also appears to be very stable over time, 
and resilient to influences from political campaigning (Gibson 2008, Gibson 2009), and 
backlash from unpopular rulings (Cann and Yates 2008). 
 This differs strongly from other intuitions, such as Congress, in which appraisals 
of both forms of legitimacy tend to move consistently, especially as the composition of 
the Congress changes. (When Democrats are in control of the Congress, Republicans tend 
to see Congress as less legitimate; similarly, when Republicans are in control of the 
Congress, Democrats tend to see it as less legitimate.)6 One explanation for this is known 
as Positivity Theory. Positivity Theory posits that the underlying reservoir of goodwill 
that Americans hold for the courts is born from the way that Americans are socialized 
about the courts (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Unlike other institutions in government, the 
courts are seen as truly distinct from the people they serve. In civic and history education, 
schools teach American youth that the courts are different—they need to be separated 
from popular influences so that they can make the best decision, not just a politically 
expedient one. The rulings of the courts are examined in the light of improving social 
norms through such means as extending the right to vote, segregating schools, and 
guaranteeing defendant rights so that innocent individuals can avoid convictions for 
                                               
6 It is possible that diffuse and specific legitimacy are more strongly correlated at the 
state supreme court level than they are in appraisals of the legitimacy of the U.S. 
Supreme Court; there is limited evidence examining the interactions of these two 
appraisals for the state court level. That said, when examined individually, appraisals of 
the legitimacy of state supreme courts do appear to be high and persistent (Cann and 
Yates 2008), and appraisals of specific legitimacy do appear to be susceptible to change 
(Gibson 2008, Gibson 2009). 
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crimes they did not commit. In addition to such a reverent history, Americans also see the 
court as distinct in its behavior and its appearance—courts representation of the law is 
palatable in its use of such symbolic garb and instruments as robes and gavels. These 
ideas that the court is different, and in many ways above politics, leads individuals to 
have a greater respect for the institution of the courts, and to respect the role that the 
courts play. When being presented with information about the courts the symbols and 
words used to relay that information act as something of a heuristic in reminding the 
individual that the courts are different. When this happens, an individual separates the 
frustration of the moment (with a ruling for example) from disillusionment with the entire 
institution (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998). While this narrative was designed to 
explain citizen responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, Positivity Theory should also apply 
to state supreme courts given that these courts also use the same symbols and engage in 
their work in the same unbiased way as justices of the Supreme Court, as the presence of 
symbols in experimental treatments has shown an improve an individual’s appraisal of 
the court’s legitimacy, even when the individual disagrees with the court’s ruling. That 
said, the effect of Positivity Theory may be less impactful for perceptions of the diffuse 
legitimacy of state supreme courts because Positivity Theory functions by activating 
known information about the courts (Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson 2014), and the public 
tends to have less knowledge about state courts than they have about the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  
Martin Shapiro proposes an alternative argument in which the courts are 
inherently perceived as legitimate because of the cultural necessity of having an impartial 
actor that can resolve conflicts between two parties. According to Shapiro it is human 
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instinct for two humans facing a dispute to seek an impartial third party, and the courts do 
this in such a culturally pervasive way that we inherently trust the institution (Shapiro 
1981). This instinct should apply to any seemingly unbiased third-party mediator and 
should therefore boost appraisals of the legitimacy of state supreme courts as well as the 
U.S. Supreme Court. However, it is important to note that if Shapiro’s theory was 
foolproof then one might expect American appraisals of the legitimacy of international 
courts to be especially high and they are for most countries with high appraisals of their 
state’s highest court, but Americans act as an outlier in this rule, generally disapproving 
of international courts (Voeten 2011).  
While Americans tend to hold general esteem for the courts, it is possible for the 
public to lose confidence in their courts completely, even with this general goodwill. For 
example, from 1966-1976 Murphy and Tanenhaus conducted a panel study that tracked 
both specific and diffuse support of the courts. They found that during this time a number 
of politically salient cases were heard by the Supreme Court. Such cases as Roe v. Wade 
and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka significantly reshaped domestic arguments 
about American culture, and in doing so the courts took a number of positions that 
appeared to fall in favor of liberal persuasions of these arguments. As a result, over the 
time of this panel measures of specific legitimacy were low among conservative-leaning 
respondents; interestingly, these conservative respondents initially reported high levels of 
diffuse legitimacy for the courts, but over time that legitimacy began to diminish. This 
implies that over time the positivist bias that Americans hold for the court can be 
reduced, and sometimes eliminated, by the actions of the court (Tanenhaus and Murphy 
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1981); Iowa’s 2010 retention elections are one example of delegitimizing forces at work 
in a case of the public’s confidence in a state supreme court. 
The public’s systematic responses to legitimizing and delegitimizing information 
have been observed using experimentation. In one such experiment, all subjects were 
shown three images before reading about a court’s decisions, but half of the subjects saw 
images of court symbols—a courthouse, a gavel, and an image of U.S. Supreme Court 
justices in their robes, and the other half saw only abstract shapes of similar colors. 
Subjects were then given a court decision that was decided contrary to the subject’s 
preferences, and then were asked to appraise the legitimacy of the court. Subjects who 
were shown symbols of the court appraised the court’s legitimacy as higher than subjects 
who did not see symbols. The authors proposed that this is because the symbols of the 
court triggered a positive association in emotional processing. When the subjects then 
were given negative information about the court subjects experienced emotional conflict, 
cognitive processing was triggered to resolve the conflict, and therefore required subjects 
to take a holistic perspective on the ruling as opposed to interpreting it exclusively 
through an emotional lens. Subjects in this condition tended to cognitively mediate the 
negative message and reported higher appraisals of the court’s legitimacy when first 
treated with symbols of the court (Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson 2014). 
These findings also help to explain early findings in the study of judicial 
legitimacy that showed respondents with increasing knowledge of the courts tended to 
view the courts as increasingly legitimate. Early investigations into the legitimacy of the 
courts found that appraisals of court legitimacy were often predictable based on 
individual-level characteristics. For example, individuals with high levels of knowledge 
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about the U.S. Supreme Court tended to appraise the Court as more legitimate than 
individuals with low levels of knowledge (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Individuals with 
high levels of knowledge of the Court are likely to be repeatedly exposed to the 
legitimizing symbols of the Court, and therefore are likely to undergo the same cognitive 
process of mediating frustration with rulings with knowledge of the Court’s processes 
and functions (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). This is an effect that should be true at both 
federal and state levels because the legitimizing symbols should be consistent across 
courts, and also because knowledge of the courts places emphasis on procedural justice 
(Tyler 2003). However, Cann and Yates find that higher knowledge of state courts tends 
to be associated with lower appraisals of state courts’ diffuse legitimacy (2008). Instead, 
these authors argue that diffuse legitimacy of state courts is based on social 
connectedness of citizens appraising the courts, as well as citizen demographics. 
Regardless of the origin of diffuse legitimacy, it does appear to be persistently high for 
state courts, just as it is for the U.S. Supreme Court, though the politics of judicial 
selection do appear to threaten the persistence of that diffuse legitimacy (Gibson 2008, 
Cann and Yates 2008).  
As our understanding of the psychological processes behind legitimacy improve, 
so does our understanding of the concept of legitimacy. Currently, legitimacy appears to 
have both emotional foundations in assessing specific legitimacy, as well as cognitive 
foundations that inform perceptions of diffuse legitimacy, though emotional and 
cognitive responses are likely to affect both appraisals. Both forms of legitimacy are 
likely to be informed by knowledge of the courts and how well the court meets subjective 
expectations about its behavior, as well as by the politics surrounding judicial selection. 
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These forms of legitimacy may be updated regularly, and both forms likely inform one 
another—if an individual’s appraisal of the court’s specific legitimacy drops substantially 
or for a long period of time then her appraisal of the court’s diffuse legitimacy is likely to 
drop as well. However, if the drop in specific legitimacy is temporary or insignificant 
then diffuse legitimacy is unlikely to be changed, and in fact is likely to result in an 
increase in specific legitimacy back to its original levels. However, it is important to note 
that all measures of legitimacy appear to be rooted in whether judges and courts meet 
individual-level expectations over time. Should the courts begin to fail this test regularly, 
the legitimacy of the courts could be in peril.  
Negativity and Its Effects 
 Negativity has become a standard feature in many campaigns, and for good 
reason: negativity attracts attention and therefore informs voters about issues relevant to 
elections (Geer 2006, Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). However, negativity comes with 
a number of drawbacks, including a potential for demobilizing and polarizing electorates 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Regardless of its actual effects, negativity has become 
a hallmark of elections, even where the courts are concerned (Gibson and Caldeira 2011, 
Gibson 2009, Jamieson and Hardy 2008, Brandenburg and Schotland 2008, Cann and 
Yates 2008). 
Negativity in politics may have a basis in the content of a message, or in the way 
a message is relayed. Negativity may relate to the information presented in a message, 
such as by attacking an attribute or position of an opponent (Hall 2014), or it may refer to 
devices in a political message that are intended to cause an emotion that is considered 
negative, such as anger or fear (Brader 2005, Mutz 2015). This indicates that negativity 
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can have both cognitive and emotional origins. Negativity is believed to work by 
engaging an individual’s primitive fight or flight response through a mechanism called 
negativity bias (Finke 1980). Negativity bias can be a judgement reached by individuals 
about stimuli (Finke 1980) but can also play a role in emotional processing (Vaish, 
Grossman, and Woodward 2008). Negativity bias is believed to have been favored during 
the natural evolution of human consciousness; emotions like fear and anger are provoked 
in situations in which the individual must (historically) act in a certain way in order to 
preserve his or her wellbeing. When exposed to stimuli that cause a fear or anger 
response, the brain enters a heightened state of awareness, working to draw in 
information that can be used to fight a dangerous entity, or safely flee from that entity. 
This heightened state of awareness allows the brain to identify likely routes of victory or 
escape and then act on them (Lau 1985) and may aid in cognitive recall of the stimulus 
(Newhagen 1998).  
As a result of their evolutionary origin, negative emotions typically take cognitive 
precedence—in the presence of negativity the source of negativity emotionally arouses an 
individual, causing the individual to focus attention on the stimuli (Ito, Larsen, Smith, 
and Cacioppo 1998, Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2010, Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). 
The effects of negativity have the ability to compound, with more negative information in 
a message tending to increase the effect of the negativity (Rozin and Royzman 2001). 
This reaction may be made possible by the fact that it is rarer to be exposed to negative 
inputs than positive inputs, making exposure to negativity a noticeable event (Lau 1985). 
Whatever the case, an individual’s reaction to negative information is swift and 
physiological—the eyes tend to move in order to take in more information, and the skin 
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becomes more conductive as the body is primed to move (Bradley, Angelini, and Lee 
2007). An individual’s sensitivity to negativity also appears to moderate this effect—
individuals who are more tolerant to negative information tend to experience less of an 
effect, whereas individuals who are less tolerant to negative information tend to be 
affected to a greater extent (Fridkin and Kenney 2011).  
Several outcomes have been observed regarding political information that is 
presented with a negative valance. First, some individuals begin to feel that they are 
unable to influence the political system, and that participating is useless (Ansolabehere, et 
al. 1994, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996), though this result is not consistent across 
situations, and in some cases, negativity may make individuals more willing to rise up 
against a negative message (Finkel and Geer 1998). When compared to positively framed 
advertisements, negative advertisements tend to improve recall of presented facts, and 
depress approval of both the ad sponsor and the ad target (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 
2007), though the deleterious effect on the sponsor is more pronounced (Lau, Sigelman, 
and Rovner 2007, Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbitt 1999); finally, memories of 
negatively framed information tend to outlast memories of positively framed information 
(Lang 1991). 
Negativity in Campaigns 
 Judicial campaigns are becoming “noisier, nastier, and costlier” (Schotland 1985). 
While general campaigns began incorporating negativity into televised advertisements in 
the second half of the twentieth century alongside the rise of television, the races for 
judgeships did not see a large uptick in negative advertising until around 2000 
(Brandenburg and Schotland 2008). Since 2000, scholarship has continued to decry the 
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increasingly costly and increasingly negative nature of judicial campaigns (Jamieson and 
Hardy 2008, Brandenburg and Schotland 2008, Gibson 2009). Watchdogs of the court, 
popular press, and professional associations have also acknowledged the increase in 
attack ads and negativity in judicial elections.7 Schotland made the above claim in 1985 
when judicial campaigns were a rising phenomenon, during a time that saw a huge 
increase in the occurrence and visibility of judicial elections, as well as increases in the 
competitiveness of judicial elections (76). It seems, however, that Schotland’s 
observation was largely based on specific and highly visible judicial elections, and not 
necessarily on an analysis of trends. Other scholars have noted what appears to be an 
increase in attack ads, especially those sponsored by political groups that are not directly 
associated with candidates, but Baum says that many of these scholars use illustrative 
instead of systematic evidence (2017). Hall’s examination of judicial advertisements used 
from 2002-2010 increase in negativity has not resulted in negative or attack 
advertisements outnumbering promotional advertisements, but the trend in recent years 
suggests that the proportion of attack ads in judicial elections is likely to be increasing 
due to the increases in political group spending on advertising, and the fact that political 
group sponsors are the most common users of attack advertising (Hall 2014, Baum 2017).  
 Some of the negative advertising in these judicial elections is attributed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002). This case 
removed many of the constraints on free speech that states had placed on candidates for 
                                               
7 See Baum (2017), Engebreston (2016), Strickler (2016), Kang and Shepherd (2015), 
Miller (2016), The Annenberg Public Policy Center (2007), Hayden (2016), Bannon, 
Velasco, Casey, and Reagan (2013), The Brennan Center for Justice (2016), and Carvel, 
Gurewitch, and John Oliver (2015) for Last Week Tonight’s coverage. 
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the bench. Before this ruling many states restricted political speech for candidates for the 
bench due to the belief that political speech would endanger the legitimacy of the state 
court system; Minnesota was one of these states. Minnesota’s code of judicial ethics 
forbade discussions of legal matters that could appear before the bench and used the 
Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards to police campaign speech of that nature. In 1998 
Gregory Wersal, a candidate for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court, filed a suit 
against Suzanne White, the chairperson of the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, 
arguing that the code of judicial ethics clearly violated free speech protections. In 2002 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the case, agreeing with the plaintiff that the right of 
candidates to free speech cannot be abridged. This ruling, in effect, opened the doors for 
judicial candidates across the U.S. to begin openly discussing relevant issues related to 
judicial elections, thus allowing the campaign industry to begin working in these 
elections as well. 
 A set of later federal court rulings8 then opened the door for increased spending of 
outside groups in judicial elections. The most important of these rulings is Citizens 
United v Federal Election Commission (2010). In this case an outside political group, 
Citizens United, wanted to air a film that was highly critical of Hillary Clinton in the 
weeks leading up to the 2008 presidential primaries. The Federal Election Commission 
(F.E.C.) barred the airing of the film on the grounds that it violated the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (B.C.R.A.). Citizens United sued the F.E.C. arguing that 
the B.C.R.A. violated the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
                                               
8 See SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission (2010). 
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Citizens United, arguing that barring outside groups from airing election-related content 
abridged the right of those groups to free speech as outlined in the First Amendment. 
Because outside groups are much more likely to sponsor negative advertising against 
judicial candidates (Hall 2015), it is likely that this ruling has influenced the tone of 
judicial elections.  
Negativity has long been a feature of judicial elections and at times is even the 
preferred way to discuss certain aspects of a candidacy such as political issues relevant to 
the race, perhaps because of memory effects related to negativity. In her review of 
judicial advertisements from 2002 to 20089, Hall finds that a number of contextual factors 
about the race also tend to influence the level of negativity used in a given election. 
These factors include whether an election is contested (with contested elections seeing a 
higher number of attack and contrast ads); selection system (nonpartisan systems see a 
greater use of attack ads than partisan systems); and interactions of the selection system 
and incumbency (with partisan incumbents using contrast and attack ads more than open 
seats, and open seats seeing more contrast and negative ads than nonpartisan races with 
incumbents) (2014). Hall does not find an increase in the use of negative ads, specifically 
attack ads, over the course of her study; in fact, Hall finds that promote advertisements 
are the most common form of advertisement during the years she investigated. It is 
important to note, however, that her study only considers elections up to 2010, meaning 
that her analysis does not include any of the changes that Citizens United may have 
caused in campaign advertising for the bench.  
                                               
9 Hall’s findings use the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying Time data to classify 
advertisements as either promotional, contrasting, or attacking; Hall pairs this data with 
race-specific data from selection contests in the states where advertisements aired.  
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In 2016 the Brennan Center for Justice released a preliminary election report 
indicating that in 2016 judicial races, outside group spending dominated candidate 
spending (and secret spenders dominated group spending), and the advertisements aired 
was more negative than they had been in recent memory. The Center specifically 
attributed the uptick in negativity to outside group spending (Brennan Center for Justice 
2016). Spending on advertisements does not necessarily reveal an increase in negative 
advertising or attack advertising, as can be seen in Table 1.2. Additional analysis of the 
ad environment is necessary and will be completed in the following chapter. It is 
important to note, however, that negativity in judicial elections is still relatively low 
compared to other state-level races (Salamone, Yoesle, and Ridout 2017); that said, the 
judiciary may be more affected by negativity in the election process than other branches 
of government, as will be discussed below.  
 The increases in the use of attack advertising is troubling because campaigns are 
one of the main sources of information the public gets about state courts, so the content 
of that information is likely to have strong effects on the way the public perceives the 
candidates and the court itself. Typically judges running for office would be expected to 
avoid especially brash or damaging speech during an election because of the way that 
speech would affect the public’s perception of the judge. This is a wise decision given 
that negativity in campaign speech tends to generate backlash against the speaker (Lau, et 
al. 1999, Lau et al. 2007). Outside groups, however, have little reason to mince words, 
and cannot be damaged by negative perceptions after an election.10 This indicates that 
                                               
10 If a group feels that their name has been too damaged to continue producing 
convincing ads, the group can simply rebrand or can dissolve and form a new group. 
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campaigns for judicial seats may not only be changing the frequency of negative ads, but 
also the effect those ads have on the electorate. 
 This study will examine negativity as it is used in the content of campaign 
advertisements. Specifically, this study will examine the use and effects of attack 
advertising and contrast advertising, both of which contain information intended to draw 
attention to negative aspects of a specific judicial candidate. To be clear, attack 
advertisements will contain a greater deal of negativity as the entire ad will be 
exclusively about the shortcomings of a specific candidate. That said, contrast 
advertisements also include negativity about a specific judicial candidate, but also contain 
positive information about a second candidate (or group of similar candidates). Scholars 
such as Freedman and Goldstein classify contrast advertisements as those that contain 
about an equal amount of positive and negative information about the candidates in 
question (1999), but other scholars such as Fowler and Ridout classify any 
advertisements that combine positive information about a candidate and negative 
information about her opponent as contrast advertisements (2013). In a study of the effect 
of presidential election ads from 2000, Meirick finds that exposure to contrast ads results 
in substantively different outcomes than exposure to negative ads.11 Specifically, Meirick 
finds that individuals tend to view contrast advertisements more favorably than attack 
advertisements, tend to find the source of contrast ads as more credible than the source of 
attack ads, found that subjects approved of subjects of contrast ads more than they 
                                               
11 Meirick uses a more conservative test of contrast ads, defining contrast ads as those 
that contain a comparison of two candidates but whose tone is not overwhelmingly 
negative; an ad that attacks an opposing candidate in contrast to a preferred candidate is 
classified as an attack ad in Meirick’s study.  
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approved of subjects of negative ads (2002). Given this information, it is clear that 
contrast advertisements, even those that use relatively little negative information, can 
have important effects on viewers that are distinct from the effects of attack 
advertisements such as improving recall and changing perceptions of candidates in the 
election. Subject evaluations of judicial candidates may be strongly influenced by the 
negativity included in contrast advertisements, and the updated conceptions caused by ad 
exposure may have a strong impact on individuals’ overall beliefs in the specific and 
diffuse legitimacy of the bench.  
Negativity and Legitimacy 
The courts have traditionally received very little public attention except in rare 
situations where the court or one of the court’s cases becomes temporarily legally or 
politically salient.  The courts receive relatively little press coverage, especially at the 
state level, and judicial elections tend to garner very little attention and money compared 
to other state elections, and as a result tend to feature high ballot roll-off, which may 
indicate that voters feel uninformed, or may indicate that voters feel that judicial elections 
do not affect the functioning of the court. These factors suggest that individuals’ 
perpetually high appraisals of the legitimacy of the courts as institutions, as well as the 
general high appraisals of specific legitimacy, are likely due to other factors. The 
mythical prototypical judge of Gibson and Caldeira’s positivity theory may explain some 
part of why individuals feel such confidence about the court.  
 The fact that individuals have tended to rely on this mythological ideal of judges 
has likely elevated their legitimacy among the public. While politicians for other offices 
are regularly in the news, often taking ideological positions, contradicting previous 
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positions, or appearing to engage in conflicts of interest, judges remain out of the 
spotlight except to release detailed explanations of policy changes as required by law.  
At this point it likely becomes easy to see how negative campaigning could harm 
the public’s perception of the legitimacy of judges—by providing information that 
appears to the public to go against the public’s beliefs about how the judiciary should act. 
Scholarly literature has identified four aspects of modern judicial campaigns that may 
decrease appraisals of legitimacy. The partisan nature of elections which appear to make 
judges look more like political actors than judges, and individuals in partisan selection 
systems tend to view the courts as less legitimate (Cann and Yates 2008, Jamieson and 
Hardy 2008, Benesh 2006). When judicial candidates engage in policy-oriented speech 
they appear to lose their impartiality which calls into question their ability to rule fairly 
(Gibson 2008). Fundraising and campaign spending from judicial candidates causes 
candidates to appear more political than judicial (Gibson, Gottfried, Delli Carpini, and 
Jamieson 2011). Attack advertising appears to diminish appraisals of legitimacy, though 
less so for judicial candidates than for legislative candidates (Gibson 2009).  
 A primary concern of judicial elections is the partisan nature of many elections. 
As noted above, seven states utilize partisan elections, and partisan cues are arguably 
present even in nonpartisan and retention election systems (such as classifying oneself as 
the conservative choice for the court, or through ballot structures that indicate the party of 
an appointing governor in a retention election). The appearance of a partisan element to 
any election can be detrimental to individuals of the public whose political beliefs lie 
contrary to those of an elected judge. The presence of political elements in a selection 
arena may also degrade diffuse legitimacy over time by eroding the myth of an impartial 
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mediator; if that mediator has a stated political affiliation, then her ability to fairly decide 
all cases comes under question. However, a number of individuals now perceive the 
courts as being inherently political, and these individuals are also less likely to see 
politicking while seeking a court seat to be problematic (Bartels, Johnson, and Mark 
2015, Bartels and Johnson 2012, Bartels and Johnson 2013). Additionally, political 
participation and knowledge of judge’s campaigns are higher in in states that use partisan 
elections to select state supreme court judges (Bonneau and Hall 2009, Hall 2016), which 
may work to preserve legitimacy by increasing perceptions of accountability.  
Policy-oriented speech is another challenge to appraisals of legitimacy that 
became salient in judicial elections. As with party affiliation, if a judge is elected after 
having campaigned on the promise that she will overturn a specific ruling or decide cases 
in such a way, members of the public that disagree with that ruling may have trouble 
believing that the judge can behave in an unbiased way when hearing cases related to the 
topic in question. In addition, it is possible that the electorate, even the portions of the 
electorate that agree with the campaign speech, will begin to see the courts as more of a 
political institution, which could have troubling effects on appraisals of legitimacy. As 
such, policy promises, or prescriptions could threaten appraisals of both dimensions of 
legitimacy; specific legitimacy has the highest probability of being affected due to its 
transient nature, but diffuse legitimacy may also be jeopardized should the appearance of 
partiality persist for so great a length of time as to begin challenging the paradigms of the 
court that members of the public have constructed. Gibson (2008) uses an experiment 
embedded in a nationally representative survey to examine the effects of exposure of 
subjects to various kinds of campaign speech in an experimental vignette (speech in 
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which candidates either refuse to discuss policy preferences, speech in which candidate 
give general views but do not comment on specific cases, and speech in which judicial 
candidates promise to issue specific rulings). He finds that policy speech consistently and 
significantly improves perceptions of the court’s legitimacy. 
Fundraising is another avenue that could harm perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
court. Candidates for the bench who are found to have taken money from special 
interests, especially if those special interests are politically salient, can provide the 
impression to voters that the candidate in question can be purchased. There is some 
evidence that suggests that judges can be bought (Shepherd 2009, Shepherd 2009, Kang 
and Shepherd 2011), and the popular press often accuses judges of just that. While 
fundraising and campaign spending are in and of themselves not problematic, there exists 
a possibility that they could be seen as a signal of dishonesty or poor behavior, which is 
most likely to affect immediate perceptions of the court, or specific legitimacy. The 
likelihood that these observations would be applied to all judges (that is, the likelihood 
that a voter would believe all judges can be bought after seeing one judge accept 
contributions from special interests) is relatively low; it seems much more likely that 
opinion changes based on fundraising evidence would be limited to appraisals of specific 
legitimacy. Research indicates that while accepting contributions can have deleterious 
effects on legitimacy, when compared to legislative elections, accepting contributions has 
a significantly weaker effect for judicial elections (Gibson 2009, Gibson and Caldeira 
2013). This indicates that any effect such fundraising may have is insignificant and 
impermanent.   
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However, any threat to perceptions of legitimacy these campaign contributions 
may pose is likely dwarfed by the threat of negative campaign advertisements. While 
positive campaign ads may suggest that a candidate will act in a certain way, negative ads 
often make those claims explicit, and often do so using misleading information about 
historical events (Jamieson and Hardy 2008). These advertisements seek to motivate fear, 
anger, and disgust by discussing rulings justices have made in which criminal offenders 
were released or making allegations about special interests to which candidates are 
indebted. While the intention behind these ads is unlikely to be to make the claim that all 
judges are easy on criminals or indebted to special interests, it is easy to see how these 
ads could have such an effect by breaking down the mythology that has sustained the 
image of impartiality, or by creating the illusion that many judges on the court fit the 
allegations.  
 In his study of “New Style Judicial Campaigns”, Gibson tests the effect of 
knowing that a candidate for the bench has used attack advertisements. To do so, Gibson 
exposed subjects to a vignette that discussed whether a candidate had engaged in attack 
advertising. He finds that attack advertisements can have no significant effect on citizens’ 
perceptions of the court’s legitimacy, especially specific legitimacy. However, Gibson 
uses a conservative test to examine the effects of negativity--Gibson’s treatment for 
advertisement tone is exposure to a vignette that discusses use of attack advertisements in 
the campaign, and not actual attack advertisements themselves. Similarly, Gibson does 
not examine the effect of contrast advertisements on his subjects. This dissertation will 
build on Gibson’s by illuminating the role that contrast advertisements, which contain 
less negative information than attack advertisements, play in updating citizen appraisals 
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of the court’s legitimacy, and will examine these effects in a more externally valid way 
by exposing subjects to actual attack and contrast advertisements used in an actual 
judicial election.  
In addition to the content of the advertisements being potentially detrimental, the 
very nature of negativity in the advertisement may make the advertisement’s effect on 
negativity more profound by increasing emotional arousal and therefore increasing the 
likelihood of retaining these ideas, and potentially even incorporating them into their 
mental models of the courts.  
Summary 
 Popular and academic accounts of judicial elections indicate two main findings 
regarding the nature of television advertising in judicial elections. First, the amount of 
money spent by outside groups during judicial elections is increasing. Second, the 
proportion of money that outside groups are spending on negative television ads is 
greater than the proportion of money that candidates or political parties are spending on 
negative advertisements. However, most of the evidence supporting these findings is 
limited, examining select elections instead of elections in aggregate, and examining 
elections from several years ago, but failing to consider more recent elections. This 
second shortcoming of current research is especially important given the court’s 2010 
ruling in Citizens United v. F.E.C. (2010). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Citizens 
United that outside political groups’ spending could not be limited during electoral 
campaigns because limiting such spending was in effect infringing on those groups’ 
members’ right to free speech. This has resulted in significant increases in campaign 
spending by outside political groups in the years following Citizens, but as of yet no 
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research has examined the effects of this ruling on judicial campaigns. This leads me to 
hypothesize that outside group spending is increasing in judicial elections, and that that 
increase in outside group spending will result in an increase of negative advertisements 
during judicial elections.  
 Given the documented effects of negativity in influencing conceptions of 
legitimacy described above, I expect that exposure to negative advertisements about a 
judicial candidate will likely result in a depression of an individual’s appraisal of the 
specific legitimacy of the court. Specifically, exposure to a negative advertisement is 
likely to draw attention to the negative aspects of a candidate, existing judge, or a court, 
and the acknowledgement of this negative trait is likely to negatively affect an 
individual’s belief that the court is behaving in congruence with the individual’s 
preferences and expectations. While this effect could be measured using a field 
experiment, there have been many successes in estimating changes to appraisals of 
specific legitimacy in the laboratory. As such, I hypothesize that exposing a subject to a 
negative advertisement will depress that subject’s appraisals of the specific legitimacy of 
the state supreme court.  
 Similarly, I expect that exposure to a negative advertisement about a judicial 
candidate will also depress individuals’ conceptions of the diffuse legitimacy of the 
courts. While a single advertisement might be unable to accurately engage the cognitive 
mechanisms necessary to update perceptions of diffuse legitimacy, the way that negative 
advertisements are structured may facilitate cognitive opinion change, not just emotional 
opinion change.  
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Plan of the Dissertation 
Content Analysis 
 My first step in revealing the role of negativity in shaping perceptions of state 
supreme courts is to conduct a content analysis of all televised advertisements for state 
supreme court elections from 2002 to 2015. I rely on advertisements captured through the 
Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying Time project which uses a media analysis company 
to document all televised judicial advertisements. I rely heavily on storyboards created by 
the Brennan Center for Justice for this analysis as well as data provided by the Brennan 
Center about funding, tone, and content of the ads aired. The data gathered from this 
content analysis are important for two reasons. First, this study is the first to examine 
negative ads with a significant number of cases occurring after the Supreme Court’s 2010 
Citizens decision affecting campaign finance laws. This will allow me to identify the 
effect that this ruling had on the number of airings, amount of spending, and frequency of 
group-sponsored negative advertisements in judicial elections. In doing so I will explore 
the features of campaign advertisements that lead to a classification of an advertisement 
as negative.  
Second, the analysis will provide a number of insights into the trends in negativity 
and spending across all judicial elections, regardless of advertisement sponsors. For 
example, if negative ads have increased, but candidate-sponsored negative ads have 
decreased, the project could indicate a clear causal connection to negativity and its 
origins. The analysis in this chapter will not only reveal the extent of the use of negativity 
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in judicial elections, but it will also highlight the conditions under which negativity is 
used in judicial elections, allowing me to demonstrate the conditions under which 
campaigns believe negativity to be most effective.  
Legitimacy Experimentation 
 Next, I plan to use a laboratory experiment to determine the effects of negative 
advertisements in judicial elections. To test the effects of negativity I have identified 
three advertisements from state supreme court elections in 2014. The ads are all 
sponsored by special interest groups, and include one promotional ad, one contrast ad, 
and one negative ad. Subjects are exposed to one advertisement, and then are asked to 
appraise the court’s legitimacy in both specific and diffuse terms. Chapter 3 considers the 
effects of negativity on subject appraisals of diffuse legitimacy, and Chapter 4 considers 
the effects of negativity on subject appraisals of specific legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER TWO: The Judicial Campaign Environment 
Introduction 
 Popular, professional, and academic accounts speak to the increasingly negative 
and increasingly expensive process of running for judge at the state level (Jamieson and 
Hardy 2008, Brandenburg and Schotland 2008, Gibson 2009). This negativity may 
significantly influence in the way that individuals appraise the courts, specifically on the 
way that the public perceives the legitimacy of the courts. Despite the significant 
influence negativity may have on the electorate, to date no study has catalogued the 
frequency and nature of negative advertising in state supreme court elections, nor the 
circumstances under which negativity is employed in these elections in recent judicial 
elections. 
 In this chapter I will compile information about elections for all state supreme 
court elections from 2005-2016.  The data compiled include all televised campaign 
advertisements, the nature of each advertisement, the amount spend to air each 
advertisement, and the number of airings of each advertisement.1 Finally, I investigate the 
influence of race-specific factors on use of negativity by a given candidate or other 
political actor. To do so I compiled a dataset of every state supreme court election from 
2000-2016, including data about the candidate, the electoral context of his or her race, 
                                               
1 The collected data also include sponsorship information and information about the 
content of each advertisement—for example, does the advertisement discuss previous 
rulings, ideological cues, or other information.  
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and data about the campaign’s success.2 This allows me to make predictions about the 
likely number of times a sponsor will air an advertisement of a certain tone. 
 I find that generally the number of ads aired, spending on ad buys, and tone of ads 
has remained largely unchanged by the Court’s 2010 campaign rulings. That said, the 
way negativity manifests in judicial elections following 2010 has changed; political 
groups have begun to dominate the use of attack ads, while candidates and political 
parties have largely moved away from such ads. These ads infuse a large degree of 
negativity into the information environment, so understanding the contexts under which 
such ads are used is essential. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The advent of television allowed candidates to begin bypassing news media and 
begin addressing the public directly using televised political advertisements. This began a 
transformation of political campaigns for races at all levels of government as candidates 
were now free to make a pitch any pitch they wanted to the public without mediation 
from the press. It did not take long for candidates to begin airing advertisements featuring 
negative tones that sought to influence the way constituents conceptualized the issues of a 
given election. These negative advertisements took many forms ranging from those 
attempting to arouse fear or anger towards specific policy issues to those that sought to 
damage the reputations of opposing candidates and parties. Despite the transformation 
that general campaigns went, judicial campaigns remained largely resistant to these 
                                               
2 The data do not include airings that occurred during numerically odd years, which 
include contests in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. 
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changes, and their campaigns remained overwhelmingly positive.3 However, around the 
year 2000 negative advertisements in judicial elections began to proliferate (Gibson 2009, 
Hall 2009).  
 The presence of negativity in campaign advertisements has been credited with a 
number of effects in elections, such as depressing turnout (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon 
and Valentino 1994), increasing turnout (Goldstein and Freedman 2002), informing the 
public (Geer and Geer 2003), under-informing the public (Hitchon and Chang 1995), and 
impacting perceptions of the legitimacy of governmental institutions (Gibson 2008). 
Negativity in judicial campaigns is likely to have an especially high impact due to the 
fact that judicial campaigns tend to occur in low-information environments, meaning that 
the public sees very little information about judicial candidates, their campaigns, and the 
issues relevant to judicial elections (Streb 2007). In these low-information environments 
campaign advertisements become a primary source of information about elections, and 
this information has additional weight due to the fact that there is little or no impartial 
information from the media balancing the effects of campaign messaging. When a 
campaign or race goes negative in the absence of impartial information there is good 
reason to expect that this negativity will have a strong impact on the way the public 
conceptualizes the candidates—after all, the public often lacks information about the state 
courts to help them to counter the effects of such negativity. Similarly, such negativity 
could conceivably shape the public’s conceptions of the offices for which the candidates 
                                               
3 While the contemplative and forward-thinking nature of the judiciary may be partially 
responsible for this resistance to change, social and legal norms for running for the bench 
were also more rigid for judges than for candidates seeking other offices. For example, 
until Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002), a number of states had passed laws 
restricting candidates’ behavior in judicial elections. 
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are running. As such, understanding the extent of negativity in these campaigns is 
essential to understanding the impact of negativity in judicial elections generally.  
Post-2010 Changes to Campaigns for the Bench 
Trends in Spending. In addition to understanding the prevalence of negativity, it is 
important to understand whether funding that goes into negative campaigning is 
increasing. Early reports from the Brennan Center suggest that the amount of money that 
is being spent on negative campaigns has increased since the Supreme Court’s 2010 
ruling in Citizens United. According to Kang and Shepherd, the investigation into 
campaign spending is warranted in the wake of Citizens United, which appears to be 
more of a significant ruling than other previous rulings about judicial elections (2015). If 
this ruling has, in fact, changed the nature of judicial elections then it is important to 
understand this impact. If the negativity in judicial elections is causing a depression in 
individuals’ conceptions of the legitimacy of courts then additional changes to judicial 
selection systems, such as public funding for campaigns and selection system changes, 
may be necessary to remediate the adverse effects of judicial elections.  
 Klumpp, Mialon, and Williams find that spending in house races has increased, 
and that this increase can be attributed to group spending (2016). Hansen, Rocca, and 
Ortiz find that while spending in presidential elections has increased since the Court’s 
ruling in Citizens United, those increases are not due to corporate spending (2015). This 
may suggest that non-corporate political groups with very little accountability are the 
agents responsible for the increase in spending observed in elections following Citizens 
United. This could be especially important because of the persistent finding that group-
sponsored advertisements tend to benefit the preferred candidate of the sponsor (Brooks 
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and Murov 2012, Dowling and Wichowsky 2012). There is also evidence that judges are 
responding to the changing election environment; Kang and Shepherd find evidence that 
judges who face election began cracking down on criminal defendants significantly 
following the Court’s ruling (2015).  
 Campaign spending on judicial elections has been increasing over time for a 
number of years (Schotland 1985, Dubois 1986, Dubois 1986, Bonneau 2004), and a 
number of scholars have written about the threats that such spending has to the proper 
functioning of the bench (Sample 2011). These trends existed before the Court’s 2010 
campaign rulings, and these rulings made it easier for cash to enter into the political fray. 
Kritzer‘s examination of judicial election spending from 1990-2016 shows that mean 
spending has increased in judicial elections overall (2017). As a result, I expect to find 
the following: 
Overall Spending Hypothesis (1): The amount of money spent on advertisements will 
increase after 2010. 
 There exists an obvious connection to spending and the number of advertisements 
aired during elections—that is, the more money that an actor has to spend during a 
campaign, the higher the number of ad airings sponsored by that actor is likely to be 
because there is cash on hand to pay for additional airings.4 As a result, I expect to find 
the following: 
 Overall Airings Hypothesis (2): The number of advertisement airings will increase after 
2010. 
                                               
4 The Pearson’s R coefficient for total spending and total number of airings is .141 where 
p<.001. 
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The Prevalence of Group Airings. Following the Court’s 2010 campaign rulings, political 
groups have begun airing more ads and spending more in elections than they previously 
had. In 2016 the Wesleyan Media Project reported that the amount that outside groups 
spent on campaign advertisements for federal offices was at an all-time high; this is not a 
new trend—the report indicates that outside group spending has increased since 2006, but 
outside group spending made a major leap following Court’s 2010 rulings, and that trend 
does not appear to be letting up (Franz, Fowler, and Ridout 2016).5 A fascinating study 
by Spencer and Wood (2014) is able to tie this trend to spending in state elections, 
demonstrating that the Court’s 2010 rulings have resulted in an approximately two-fold 
increase in campaign spending for state-level offices, nearly all of which is the result of 
outside group spending. This large increase in spending is likely to result in a number of 
changes to the way that campaigns seek to disseminate their messages, but one concrete 
way that this is likely to occur is through increased airings of political advertisements 
aired by outside group sponsors. Increasing the number of airings of advertisements is a 
natural step because the cost of creating the advertisement is likely to remain largely 
stable, but increasing airings is likely to boost both the number of people reached, and 
potentially the impact of the advertisement (Gerber, Gimpel, Green, and Shaw 2011). As 
such, I expect to find the following: 
Group Sponsor Airings Hypothesis (3): Airings of political group-sponsored 
advertisements will increase after 2010.  
                                               
5 This trend has been directly attributed to the passage of Citizens United by such authors 
as Hansen, Rocca, and Ortiz (2015). 
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The Prevalence of Negativity. As discussed in Chapter 1, popular and academic accounts 
have claimed that spending in general has increased, and that spending on negatively-
oriented campaign speech has increased as well, specifically in the wake of those 2010 
rulings. For example, Fowler and Ridout (2012) find that negativity in presidential 
campaigns grew from about 30% of advertisements aired in 2000 to about 45% in 2004, 
50% in 2008, and 65% in 2012; this indicates a clear increase in the proportion of 
negativity over time. When the authors further deconstructed these findings, they 
determined that promotional ads have generally decreased over the same time; 
promotional ads made up 40% of all advertisements aired in 2000, but made up only 20% 
in 2012, whereas attack advertisements have risen from 30% of all ads in 2000 to 50% of 
all ads in 2012. Overall airings of ad by tone are available in Table 2.1. 
Similarly, the 2010 rulings would have the most impact on the way that groups 
spend money in elections—because groups are more likely than other sponsors to spend 
their money on negative campaigning (Fowler and Ridout 2010), analyzing changes in 
group spending following the 2010 rulings, as well as the nature of the campaigning that 
that spending indicates, is essential to understanding the full effect that the rulings had on 
judicial elections. Franz (2012) finds that political groups went from a pre-2010 height of 
buying 14.5% of presidential primary ads in 2004 to buying 59% of presidential primary 
ads in 2012, indicating that the Court’s 2010 rulings have a strong chance to influence the 
information environment of lower-salience campaigns. Franz notes that party spending 
during that time dropped, which follows a trend starting in 1992 for all election types. 
These observations lead me to expect the following: 
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Proportion of Negativity Hypothesis (4): The proportions of negative advertisements will 
increase after 2010. 
Group Sponsors and Tone. Finally, the 2010 rulings have likely changed the way that 
political groups become involved in judicial elections. The 2010 rulings would have the 
most impact on the way that groups spend money in elections—because groups are more 
likely than other sponsors to spend their money on negative campaigning (Fowler and 
Ridout 2010), analyzing changes in group spending following the 2010 rulings, as well as 
the nature of the campaigning that that spending indicates, is essential to understanding 
the full effect that the rulings had on judicial elections. Franz (2012) finds that political 
groups went from a pre-2010 height of buying 14.5% of presidential primary ads in 2004 
to buying 59% of presidential primary ads in 2012, indicating that the Court’s 2010 
rulings have a strong chance to influence the information environment of lower-salience 
campaigns. Franz notes that party spending during that time dropped, which follows a 
trend starting in 1992 for all election types.  
Other Contextual Factors. Each of these factors is expected to contribute to the 
prevalence of the use of both advertisements and the use of negative advertising in 
judicial elections. However, explaining these trends alone fails to demonstrate 
systematically those contextual elements that may contribute to the use of advertisements, 
and specifically to the use of negative elements in those advertisements. Bonneau and 
Hall (2009) find that a one percent decrease in vote in the margin of victory tends to yield 
a 2.7 percent increase in spending; as an election becomes tighter (or as the distance 
between the total votes of candidates becomes smaller), political actors tend to spend 
more and more money in an effort to win the election. In other words, the closer an 
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election is, the more money both parties are likely to spend in order to assure that the 
public hears (and is influenced by) their message. I expect that more competitive 
elections will see increased use of advertisements. Adding to the competitive nature of 
the seat is the system of selecting judges. Bonneau and Hall note that it is difficult for 
candidates to get their message out to voters when those candidates are elected through 
non-partisan selection. This means that spending in an election is higher in nonpartisan 
elections than in party-based selection because candidates recognize that voters lack 
much of the information they typically use when making decisions in the ballot box.6 
Given this spending increase, advertisement airings in nonpartisan system should be 
higher, as well. 
 Other contextual factors, such as whether the election is held in a presidential 
election year (when many other voices are looking to be heard and both spending and 
political contributions tend to be higher (Franz 2012)), incumbency status of the 
candidates (Bonneau and Hall 2009), the system of selection (Hall 2016) and whether the 
election occurred before or after the Citizens United ruling will all likely impact the 
number of advertisements aired, as well as the amount of money spent to air those 
advertisements.  
Data and Methods 
 To assemble the data necessary to perform this analysis I conducted two distinct 
investigations, both of which relied heavily on data compiled by the Brennan Center for 
                                               
6 These findings are challenged by Hall’s reports of spending in contested supreme court 
elections from 1996-2008, where she found that partisan elections tended to see the 
highest levels of candidate spending, though this examines only candidate spending in the 
raw, excluding other contextual factors (2016). 
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Justice’s Buying Time project. I supplemented that data with publicly available ballot data 
from state secretaries of state, and news reports as compiled by Access World News. I 
then analyzed these data using a combination of frequency analysis and correlative 
analysis.  
 My investigation began by examining data collected by the Brennan Center for 
Justice. The Brennan Center operates out of the New York University School of Law and 
seeks to improve access to equality under government by collecting information related 
to voting rights, campaign finance, mass incarceration, and protecting personal liberties.7 
The Center then makes much of that information available to the public, and also 
publishes regular reports on the status of their work. Beginning in 2000 the Brennan 
Center began collecting information related to televised judicial campaign advertising 
with the assistance of Kantar Media/Campaign Media Analysis Group. The 
advertisement data collected by this partnership includes a record of all televised judicial 
ads that air in the United States and is collected using satellite capture. Satellite capture is 
achieved by placing small boxes in representative homes across a region. When 
television is watched in these homes the boxes listen for cues that identify and record the 
content aired in the home; as a result, the records collected by Kantar Media are believed 
to be quite exhaustive. The record includes the advertisement title, the sponsor, the cost 
of airing the ad, the number of times the advertisement was aired, and a story board 
showing the language the advertisement uses as well as a number of stills to provide 
                                               
7 It should be noted that while The Brennan Center remains impartial and uncommitted 
on the appropriateness of the various judicial selection systems, the center holds similar 
critiques for the political nature of partisan and nonpartisan selection (Kowal 2016), 
while identifying merit selections as appropriate (Blitzer 2009).  
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visual context. In recent years the project has also managed to capture and upload entire 
advertisements that are also available to the general public. 
 After the advertisements have been captured and the financial data has been 
collected, research staff working with the Brennan Center then code each advertisement 
based on its content—specifically the tone and themes presented by the ad. The tone of 
the advertisements falls into one of three categories: promotional, contrasting, or 
attacking. The classifications of advertisement tone have not changed throughout the 
duration of the project. The classifications that the coders have used for content of the ads 
has changed significantly over time, but the data provide some insight into the ways that 
judicial candidates have hoped to be perceived over time. 
The data collected and distributed by the Brennan Center provide a previously 
unavailable look into the ways that candidates for the bench have sought to make their 
campaigns known to the electorate. The data also provide an essential perspective of 
judicial campaigns over time—the dataset now extends over sixteen years from a variety 
of states, representing each of the main judicial selection types found in the states. 
 However, it must be noted that the data provided by the Brenan Center are 
imperfect and incomplete. First, the dataset contains only ads are captured by Kantar 
Media/Campaign Media Analysis Group via satellite capture. This means that the air data 
are potentially incomplete as web-viewed and other online ad airings may be missed in 
their process.8 This means that there may be a number of advertisements that are aired 
during these elections that remain uncounted and unknown. Second, the spending data 
                                               
8 Internet ads have become significantly more common in all elections due to their 
cheapness and likelihood of being reported on by news organizations which extends 
exposure to ads while saving campaign cash (Ridout and Smith 2008). 
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that are available may in some circumstances be incomplete. The reported financial data 
include only the purchase price for airing the advertisement. This means that the cost of 
producing as well as consulting fees associated with designing and airing negative ads is 
unaccounted. In some cases, spending information is incomplete due to states’ reporting 
laws which enable some campaigns, parties, or political groups to report less information 
than in other states. However, the Brennan Center works to use any information 
available, including document filings and press information to flesh out the expense data. 
As a result of the inconsistent capture of campaign expenditures an element of non-
random error is introduced into estimates of spending in this chapter. That is to say that 
estimates of spending will always skew lower than actual amounts spent because of 
spending that is not reported in some cases. It is also possible that these data 
underestimate specific kinds of selection more frequently as states with the lowest 
reporting mandates all use retention systems (Corriher 2012). As such these data provide 
a conservative estimate of spending in each model.  
Despite these potential drawbacks, the Brennan Center data have been used to 
better understand the campaign environments during judicial selection. One clear reason 
is convenience—nowhere else does such a comprehensive database about judicial 
campaigns exist for the public. A second is that themes of negativity and spending overall 
are likely to correlate with spending on regional satellite television. While there are data 
missing, and those data could frustrate the narratives created by the Brennan Center data, 
the most likely case is that these advertisements are largely reflective of actual air 
numbers. Any deviation from the true numbers is likely non-random, and as with expense 
data is likely to underestimate air data, providing a more conservative test of the 
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hypotheses in this chapter. Similarly, it is likely that campaigns spend in roughly the 
same patterns on advertisement buys, and it is also likely that when campaigns go 
negative they do so across the available advertisement platforms as opposed to only on 
local cable or regional satellite television. So, while these data are incomplete, the data 
provide a previously impossible glimpse into the way that judicial elections work, and 
therefore, with data limitations in mind, the data warrant analysis and will provide useful 
information as to the nature of judicial campaigns.  
To guarantee that the Brennan Center’s coding of the tones of advertisements was 
consistent and met the needs of this project, I randomly selected 60 cases, or about 21% 
of the dataset, viewed the ads without knowing the Brennan Center’s coding of the ads, 
and recorded the tone of the advertisements as promotional, contrasting, or attacking. My 
coding was consistent with that of the project about 97% of the time. Our coding was 
always congruent on promotional ads, but I misidentified 2 of the Brennan Center’s 
contrast advertisements as attack ads because Brennan uses a classification of contrast 
advertisements most akin to that of Fowler and Ridout (2013). However, I have kept the 
Brennan Center’s coding due to the fact that their coding will provide a more 
conservative estimate of my hypotheses. 
To determine the sponsor type from each advertisement I used the Brennan 
Center’s sponsor data, then determined whether the sponsor was a political party, a 
candidate in the race, or a group. 100% of ads included in the Brennan Center dataset 
clearly fit one of these categories.  
The number of open seats available during each race was calculated in one of 
three ways. The first was through the Brennan Center’s campaign summaries which 
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indicated all candidates for the bench for many of the state-years their data covered. 
However, these summaries were sometimes incomplete, or were unavailable (especially 
in the early years of the dataset), so I supplemented the data with ballot information 
garnered from various secretaries of states’ websites. If a state’s secretary of state website 
did not have historical ballot information, I then turned to Access World News to find 
state or regional newspapers with comprehensive state election coverage. Using these 
sources, I was able to accurately add the number of open seats to each state-year in the 
dataset.  
Dependent Variables 
This work investigates four main dependent variables; they include the following: 
counts of airings of judicial campaign advertisements of various tones, the proportion of 
negative advertisements aired, the amount spent on various tones of advertisements by 
various sponsors, and the number of airings of ads of various tones by various sponsors.  
It is important to reiterate that in order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, I 
created two distinct datasets. The unit of analysis in the first dataset is advertisements—
each advertisement that aired on television during the elections under examination was 
included in the dataset, as well as information about that advertisement’s tone, number of 
airings, amount spent airing the advertisement, the advertisement’s sponsor, and 
information about the advertisement’s content (such as whether it examined previous 
rulings or was a partisan attack). The second dataset examines the behavior of actual 
candidates in each race under consideration. In this dataset the unit of analysis is 
candidate; in each seat the top two candidates are considered. This dataset pairs 
contextual information with each candidate, such as the amount of money they spent on 
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various advertisements, contextual factors such as incumbency, and electoral information 
such as the margin of victory. These factors will be examined below. All of the data for 
the dependent variables was collected through the Brennan Center’s data repositories 
from the Buying Time project.  
Independent Variables  
I use a number of independent variables to help predict the values of the various 
dependent variables of interest. As such, I will examine each individually. 
Selection System. As previously noted the system of judicial selection is likely to impact 
the competitiveness of the seat, and therefore may influence the number of ads aired, the 
tone of those ads, and the amount of money required to air those ads. Additionally, the 
system of selection may influence voters’ expectations and preferences regarding 
advertisement content during a campaign. For example, given the nonpartisan nature of 
nonpartisan elections, it is feasible that voters prefer to not see advertisements that 
involve certain kinds of attacks, like those based on ideology. As such, system is an 
incredibly important independent variable for predicting the frequency and nature of 
advertisements used in an election. Selection system data were collected through the 
American Judicature Society’s9 website judicialselection.us. This website includes 
historical data regarding changes to judicial selection systems in each state, so I was able 
to guarantee the system used in each race in this dataset. Selection system is represented 
                                               
9 The American Judicature Society in a nonpartisan nonprofit organization made up of 
lawyers, judges, academics, and community leaders that works as a watchdog for and 
source of information about the American judiciary. The AJS dissolved during the 
authorship of this dissertation, but its operations, including judicialselection.us, were able 
to continue through the Hawaii State Chapter.   
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in the dataset using two dummy variables: partisan and nonpartisan. Figure 2.1 shows a 
breakdown of ad airings from 2002-2014 in the various systems. Nonpartisan elections 
tend to garner the highest number of all ads, and the greatest proportion of attack ads, and 
retention elections tend to see very few ads overall.  
Incumbency. It is well established that incumbency has a number of electoral effects in 
congress (Abramowitz 1975, Bernhardt and Ingerman 1985, Johannes and McAdams 
1981) and on the bench (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Voters tend to vote for incumbents, an 
effect believed to be due to name recognition (Abramowitz 1975),10 as well as a 
collective action problem born from the public’s uncertainty about which policies, 
rulings, and outcomes should be ascribed to specific candidates given the collective 
nature of the bench (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002).11 It should be noted that the 
incumbency effect can be mediated by the quality of the incumbent’s challenger (Hall 
and Bonneau 2006) and other contextual factors such as selection system (Bonneau and 
Hall 2003). To determine the effect of incumbency, I examine whether the candidate in 
question is an incumbent or is facing off against an incumbent.12 (Candidates facing 
retention elections are designated as incumbents as they are likely to benefit from the 
                                               
10 Klein and Baum’s 2001 study shows that including information about a candidate’s 
incumbency on the ballot has no clear effect, but the incumbency advantage has been 
demonstrated in the literature (Bonneau and Hall 2009), which suggests that name 
recognition is a central cause of the incumbency advantage. 
 
11 It is important to note that the effects of incumbency in judicial elections are not 
certain, and the incumbency advantage is known to vanish depending on contextual 
factors such as selection system and perceptions of the bench (Hall 2001), especially 
given that increases in campaign spending is not nearly as advantageous for incumbents 
as it is for challengers (Bonneau 2007). 
12 I do not measure whether the incumbent was appointed or whether the incumbent won 
his or her seat in another election due to the evidence that name recognition is the key 
causal factor in the incumbency advantage, and not necessarily campaign experience. 
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same name recognition as incumbents in other systems.) Both of these variables are 
measured as binaries; it is possible that in a given race there may be an incumbent who 
faces no opponent, and in those circumstances no candidate would be marked as “against 
incumbent.” This allows me to sort out the effect of each candidate in relation to their 
incumbency status. The incumbency status of each candidate is noted in the Brennan 
Center election overview that is included with the advertisement information for each 
state-year. In the years considered in this dissertation 195 incumbent candidates sought 
reelection.  
Competition. I attempt to measure competition using two different variables. The first is 
whether the candidate ran unopposed. As noted above, the Brennan Center’s inclusion of 
incumbency data allowed me to include this binary variable. Seventy-seven candidates in 
my dataset ran unopposed. However, this variable has been excluded from the analysis 
because of its low variance (see Table 2.2). 
As a result, the measure that I use for competition is the margin of victory for the 
race. A smaller margin of victory is indicative of a highly competitive race, whereas a 
larger margin of victory is indicative of a race lacking competition. This measure was 
among the more difficult measures to find, but I was able to calculate the victory of 
margin for each race using data from each state’s secretary of state website, as well as 
reports of certified vote totals published in state and regional newspapers, which I 
accessed using Access World News. The margin of victory is the proportion of votes that 
went to the winning candidate, minus the proportion of votes that went to the losing 
candidate, divided by the total number of votes cast in the election. It must be noted that 
the vote total, from which the margin of victory is derived, occurs after the election and 
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all subsequent campaigning have concluded, and as such could be a problematic variable 
given that the effects examined in this chapter’s models occur before the cause (vote 
differential). However, I am not arguing that vote differential per se affects campaign 
strategies, but instead I argue that vote differential inversely correlates with the 
competitiveness of a given race and can therefore be used as a measurement for 
competition.  
Presidential Election Year. Because presidential election years typically involve a very 
crowded media/information environment with many voices competing for attention, I 
expect that the cost of running a campaign in a presidential election year is substantially 
higher than running in other years due to the crowded and demand-heavy nature of 
advertising during this time. As a result, I expect to find that races held in presidential 
election years will see higher levels of spending. This variable is recorded as a binary 
variable.  
Tone. The tone of the advertisements used in judicial elections is the central focus of this 
dissertation. The Brennan Center’s records the tone of each advertisement that airs during 
judicial elections. For the Brennan Center, tone has three attributes, and each is quite 
distinct. The first attribute is “promote.” These are advertisements that include only 
promotional information about a candidate, such as their professional successes or other 
relevant experiences that make them a good fit for the office. Promote advertisements 
rarely reference a candidate’s opponent, instead focusing exclusively on the attributes of 
the sponsoring candidate.  
The second attribute is “contrast.” Contrast advertisements contain a mixture of 
promotional information regarding the sponsoring candidate and attack or negatively-
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oriented information regarding the candidate’s opponent. A typical contrast 
advertisement will begin by discussing the negative qualities of a candidate’s opponent 
and will end by providing information about the sponsoring candidate that suggests the 
sponsoring candidate will not have the same issues as his or her opposition. 
Finally, the third attribute is “attack.” Attack advertisements are those that go into 
great detail about negative aspects of the sponsoring candidate’s opponent. Attack 
advertisements rarely include any information about the sponsoring candidate outside of 
that candidate’s endorsement of the advertisement. The remainder of the advertisement’s 
content is used to show a shortcoming of the candidate’s opponent.  
The original coding for variable was derived exclusively from the Brennan 
Center’s coding of each advertisement. However, an additional variable was created 
using the information above. Because contrast advertisements by definition include a 
reference to negative attributes about a candidate’s opposition, these advertisements may 
be argued to have a negative emotional valence. Recognizing the influence that any form 
of negativity may have on appraisals of judicial legitimacy, I have created an additional 
measure of tone that examines all negative advertisements in a given election; to do this I 
simply combined the number of airings of both attack and contrast advertisements for 
each seat. 
After Citizens. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the cases of Citizens 
United and Speechnow.org have greatly changed the nature of elections. As such, I 
expect to see a distinction in frequency of airing, dollars spent, and perhaps even tone of 
advertisements used after the enactment of these rulings. To examine this temporal effect, 
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I have employed a binary that records whether the advertisement was published before or 
after the Citizens ruling.  
Winning Campaign. Finally, I have included a measure indicating whether the candidate 
in question won the election. This measure creates some problems, especially given that 
it measures an effect that occurs before the cause. However, the main goal of this variable 
is to determine whether winning campaigns tend to behave in similar or systematic ways 
in the time leading up to judicial elections. In other words, this variable is intended to 
capture attributes of the campaign that occur leading up to the final outcome of an 
election. 
Results 
Overall Spending Hypothesis (1) 
 The Overall Spending Hypothesis (1) holds that the amount of money spent on 
advertisements will increase after 2010, primarily as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
rulings that year related to campaign law. To investigate this hypothesis, compiled 
spending data by seat. 
First, Figures 2.2 shows that while amounts are inconsistent, it does appear that 
more money is being spent on airing televised political ads during judicial elections. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 break these spending totals down to show the specific tones that are 
represented by the spending for each year. There appears to be little reason to assume that 
the Citizens United or Speechnow.org rulings had any effect on the amount of money that 
political actors spent on air time; after 2010 spending by open seat does not appear to 
consistently increase. These findings are confirmed in Table 2.3, which contains the 
average amount spent for each candidate facing a judicial election from 2005-2016. 
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While inconsistent, it does appear that ad-buy spending has, on average, increased 
over time from 2005 to 2016, though the increases are not consistent over time, so likely 
vary by contextual factors such as the competitiveness of the seats in question. The 
practices of sponsoring entities will be examined more thoroughly below (see the 
discussions of Hypotheses 4 and 5). An unpaired t-test comparing ad-buy spending from 
2005-2010, and then from 2011-2016 yields a p-value of 0.2644, indicating that the 
differences in spending are likely to be the result of chance, and may not be as a result of 
a systematic increase in spending. It is important to note that it is possible that campaign 
spending is increasing when controlling for appropriate factors; this will be explored 
further in my discussion of Hypothesis 3.  
In conclusion, I do not find support for the Overall Spending Hypothesis (1); it 
does not appear that the amount of money spent on televised political advertisements for 
state supreme court elections has changed significantly in the years following the Court’s 
2010 campaign rulings.  
Overall Airing Hypothesis (2) 
The Overall Airing Hypothesis (2) proposes that the number of advertisement 
airings will increase after the court’s 2010 campaign rulings. To investigate this 
hypothesis, I have developed a model that examines predictors of campaign 
advertisement airings and allows me to directly examine the distinction in advertisement 
airings between pre- and post-Citizens elections. 
 As is shown in Table 2.4 the effect of Citizens on the number of ads aired does 
not appear to support Hypothesis 2; campaigns occurring after 2010 tend to no 
statistically significant change in attack ad airings, promote ad airings, or negative ad 
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airings in general, but do see a decrease of about 74 contrast airings (p<.05), all other 
factors held constant. There are a number of other contextual factor that help predict the 
number of advertisement airings, including incumbency and contextual factors.  
 System of election showed few implications, as well. No statistically significant 
differences were found between partisan and nonpartisan system airings of all tones of 
advertisement, but retention elections do see about 568 fewer promote advertisements 
than nonpartisan elections tend to see (p<.01).  
 Incumbency had a number of interesting effects on the number of ads aired. 
Incumbents tend to see about 1916 fewer attack ads (p<.10) and about 1949 fewer 
negative ads (p<.10) than non-incumbents, and individuals running against incumbents 
tend to see 1842 fewer attack ads (p<.10), 308 more promote ads (p<.05), and 1888 fewer 
negative ads (p<.10) than individuals not running against incumbents.  
 Contextual factors that played a minimal role in predicting the number of airings 
of various tones of ads in judicial elections, but judicial elections occurring after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United tend to see about 74 fewer contrast ads when 
other factors are held constant.  
 These results, taken together, indicate that ad airings did not, in fact, increase 
following the Court’s 2010 campaign rulings, and therefore do not support for the Overall 
Airings Hypothesis (2). 
Group Sponsor Airings Hypothesis (3) 
 The Group Sponsor Airings Hypothesis (3) holds that political groups will air 
more ads per seat following the Court’s 2010 rulings. Figure 2.5 shows a general trend in 
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increased group spending since 2010, so there is reason to believe that groups are airing 
more ads per seat than other sponsors.  
 Figure 2.6 shows that outside groups rarely spend more per year than other 
sponsor types. In fact, only one time in the observation period did outside groups spend 
more than other groups in judicial elections-however, this provides only a partial glimpse 
at the story. To better understand group spending I have created a model that predicts the 
number of airings of ads of various tones by outside political groups, which can be found 
in Table 2.5.  
This model indicates that political groups have aired more attack ads since the 
Court adopted new campaign standards in 2010. Following Citizens United, groups are 
likely to air about 21 fewer contrast ads (p<.05), and 108 fewer promote ads (p<.01). 
However, the model predicting airings of attack advertisements does not provide a 
statistically significant finding regarding the impact of Citizens United, so Hypothesis 3 
cannot be supported. 
  Incumbency does appear to have a significant impact on the ways that outside 
political groups tend to air advertisements. When supporting an incumbent, groups tend 
to air 1985 fewer attack advertisements (p<.10) and 2053 fewer advertisements overall 
(p<.10) than they would air for non-incumbents, with all other factors held constant. 
Groups supporting candidates running against incumbents tend to air 1921 fewer attack 
advertisements (p<.10) and 131 more promote advertisements (p<.05) than when groups 
support candidates who do not face an incumbent.  
 System of selection does not appear to have a major impact on the likelihood of 
airing ads of different tones. The only statistically significant difference found between 
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selection systems is that partisan elections tend to see 84 fewer promote ads than 
nonpartisan systems (p<.05).   
As elections become less competitive contrast advertisements are expected to 
increase their use of contrast ads, but the effect is minimal with a .9 vote differential 
resulting in only about two additional airings of contrast ads.  
Taken together these findings do not offer support to the Group Sponsor Airings 
Hypothesis (3)—political groups do not appear to air more politically negative 
advertisements per seat following the Court’s 2010 rulings.  
Proportion of Negativity Hypothesis (4) 
The Proportion of Negativity Hypothesis (4) holds that the proportions of 
negative advertisements (as opposed to other tones of advertisements) will increase after 
the Court’s 2010 rulings. Table 2.6 shows a breakdown of the number of airings of each 
advertisement tone throughout the years considered in this election, as well as the number 
of original ads of each tone. An unexpected finding from this table is that while political 
actors tend to make far fewer attack and contrast ads than promote ads, attack and 
contrast ads tend to receive a higher number of airings overall.  
Table 2.7 indicates that the number of negative advertisements being aired do not 
increase steadily year-by-year from 2006 to 2014, nor do the number of airings of 
negative advertisements.  This indicates that many of the observations made in the 
academic and popular studies are unfounded. While negative advertisements are often a 
prevalent feature of specific elections, overall their prevalence (as measured by number 
of negative advertisements used in elections, as well as the number of times negative 
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advertisements are aired, conditional upon the number of open seats) is much less than 
expected.  
Similarly, according to this model, the number of negative advertisements, and 
the amount that those advertisements are aired does not appear to have been influenced 
by the Supreme Court’s rulings in Speechnow.org (2010) and Citizens United (2010). In 
the light of previous reports this is a surprising finding but may provide some relief for 
entities that perceive campaign spending by outside groups to be a significant 
contributing factor in altering the tone of judicial elections; based on this analysis, these 
claims appear to be based on different observations than the actual frequencies of 
negative advertisements in judicial elections. 
Table 2.7 contains the proportion of negative ads created and the proportion of 
times negative ads were aired in judicial elections from 2006-2014. The proportion of 
negative advertisements aired does not consistently grow or shrink from 2006-2014. In 
fact, three of the four years with the lowest proportion of negative ads occur in 2012, 
2013, and 2014. This indicates that the proportion of negativity is not consistently 
increasing in judicial elections when measured by the number of negative advertisements 
created, or when measured by the number of airings of negative advertisements. This also 
indicates that the role of the court’s rulings regarding comparing finance is more muted 
than previously believed.  
While the number and frequency of negative advertisements does not appear to be 
changing over time, even in the context of Citizens United and Speechnow.org, this does 
not necessarily capture the influences that money and negativity may have on judicial 
elections. For example, while the frequency of negativity may not change, the amount 
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that groups spend to produce negative advertisements may be changing. Similarly, groups 
may air negative advertisements on more prevalent channels, or may be airing negative 
advertisements during prime time, or during other television events whose air time is 
more expensive. As such, I will now examine the role of campaign finance in explaining 
conceptions of negativity in judicial elections. 
Unlike in the case of total spending on judicial advertisements, the amount that 
sponsors are spending on ad-buys to televise negative advertisements does appear to 
increase over time, especially after 2010. However, in examining whether the increase in 
spending on negative ad-buying is significant, a t-test uncovers a p-value of .5215, 
indicating that any increases after 2010 could be attributed to random fluctuation. This 
indicates that not only is the amount of money being used to buy airtime not clearly 
increasing, but there appears to be no noticeable impact from the Court’s 2010 rulings. 
 These findings certainly challenge Proportion of Negativity Hypothesis (4). In 
fact, the opposite of this hypothesis appears to be true—it appears that spending has 
increased, but that spending has largely gone towards promotional advertisements. This 
may be due to voters’ appetites for promotional versus derogatory or negative 
advertisements about judges. Perhaps advertising agents are aware of the public’s extant 
levels of diffuse support and have chosen to work within their existing frameworks 
instead of attempting to demean the institutions of the courts.  
 This finding, however, does not show that groups have increased in negativity, 
but that other sponsors (parties and candidates) have drifted away from the use of 
negativity in their campaigns. The results of this investigation therefore demonstrate that 
following the Court’s 2010 campaign decisions neither the proportion of money spent on 
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negative advertisements, nor the likelihood of using negative advertisements appears to 
increase; as a result, the Proportion of Negativity Hypothesis (4) does not appear to be 
supported.  
Discussion 
 The judicial election literature suggests that negativity in judicial elections is 
increasing, and that the likely culprit of the increase is outside group spending as enabled 
by the Supreme Court’s 2010 rulings about campaign speech and campaign finance. In 
testing these claims, I have reached the following conclusions: 
• Negativity is not necessarily increasing in judicial elections.  
• Spending surrounding judicial campaigns also does not appear to be increasing.  
• Outside groups do not appear to be airing more ads, negative or otherwise, after 
the Court’s ruling in Citizens United.  
Negativity does not appear to be increasing in judicial elections using the 
measures of this study. However, these measures have their limitations. A binary estimate 
of negativity may make it difficult to estimate the actual amount of negativity—some ads 
may have a negative feel (using colors, music, or camera angles) but abstain from making 
overtly negative statements, for example. Similarly, contrast ads often contain negative 
information, but only directly negative ads were included in this study. It is also possible 
that a number of elections, especially for courts considering politically or socially salient 
rulings, are extremely negative, while other elections may tend to be more positive. This 
suggests that a more in-depth analysis of the occurrence of negativity could be justified.  
Spending in judicial elections also does not appear to be increasing. This is 
somewhat surprising in the context of other elections that are generally increasing—local 
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elections, state elections, and national elections have all become costlier over time, but 
judicial elections do not immediately fit this trend.  
Outside groups do not appear to be increasing the amount of negativity they use to 
portray judicial candidates, but they do make up a bulk of spending and negativity when 
considered as a proportion of other groups. This may indicate that outside groups are 
likely to use negativity in elections that meet certain qualifications, such as rulings that 
are especially politically or socially salient. 
Conclusion 
 Taken together these findings suggest that group advertisers, while not necessarily 
increasing the overall occurrence of negativity in judicial elections, have ensured that that 
level of negativity has remained constant despite a decrease in use of negativity in both 
political parties and among candidates. This is good news for groups concerned that 
negativity in judicial elections is becoming a more prevalent feature of judicial elections 
but may leave those parties concerned as there is still a high degree of negativity present 
in judicial elections; negativity is especially prevalent in nonpartisan elections, and group 
sponsors appear to be putting out the largest proportion of negativity during judicial 
campaigns. Because these groups are not held to the same standards as candidates and 
political parties, outside political groups have little reason not to use especially arousing 
advertisements in order to have a greater impact on the perspectives of voters. It follows 
that such advertisements could have a strong impact on the way that individuals perceive 
of courts’ legitimacy. In the following chapters I will examine the effects of these group-
sponsored negative campaign advertisements on individual perceptions of the court’s 
specific and diffuse legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER THREE: Effects of Negativity on Perceptions of Diffuse Legitimacy 
Introduction  
 Starting in the early 2000s the state of Wisconsin was plagued with high-cost and 
tremendously negative judicial campaigns. The Brennan Center for Justice notes that in 
2007 Wisconsin saw $6 million in total television advertisement spending, and in 2008 
the state spent $3.8 million on television advertisement spending, dwarfing all other races 
that year. Then in 2009 Wisconsin’s chief justice broke the state’s judicial campaign 
fundraising record, raising just short of $1.5 million. In 2009 the Wisconsin legislature 
passed public financing to reduce the influence of money in Wisconsin judicial elections, 
and with the hopes of improving the tone of those elections (Brennan Center for Justice 
2011). Unfortunately, the tone continued to be quite negative. In 2011 incumbent David 
Prosser faced three challengers in Wisconsin’s primary, and then went on to face JoAnne 
Kloppenburg in the general election (Wisconsin uses a nonpartisan selection system); 
both candidates opted into the state’s new public financing option which gave each 
candidate $100,000 for campaign spending and reduced the amounts that both candidates 
could accept from donors.  
 Unfortunately, the incorporation of public funding did little to improve the tone of 
the election, or to reduce the amount of money spent. While the candidates themselves 
were restricted in the amounts that they could raise, outside political groups saw no such 
restriction. These groups spent nearly $3.6 million in television ads, many of them quite 
negative (Brennan Center for Justice 2011). In one ad sponsored by the Greater 
Wisconsin Committee a narrator informs viewers that candidate David Prosser once 
called the female chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court “a total bitch,” and then 
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later “threatened to ‘destroy’ her” (see Appendix F for a transcript and stills from the 
advertisement). While the language used in the advertisement is uncommon, the 
emotional shock and steep negativity of the advertisement are not, especially when the 
advertisement is being run in support of a candidate instead of by a candidate.  
 In the previous chapter I established that reports of increasing negativity in 
judicial elections, as well as reports of increased spending on televised advertisements, 
appear to be somewhat overblown. However, despite the fact that negativity and 
campaign advertisement spending are not necessarily increasing altogether, a great deal 
of negativity exists in specific judicial races, and most of that negativity comes from 
groups that cannot be held accountable for the information that they disseminate during 
campaigns (Dowling and Wichowsky 2012). Negativity in judicial campaigns likely has a 
number of important electoral effects, but these effects on potential voters are generally 
underexplored. This is especially true in regard to the effects of advertisements that 
combine aspects of negativity with positive aspects of another candidate in contrast 
advertisements. As such, the following two chapters will seek to explain the way that 
negative advertisements, both attack and contrast advertisements, shape individual-level 
thinking regarding state supreme courts.  
 The chapters will focus primarily on the effect of group-sponsored advertisements 
of various tones on individual appraisals of state courts’ legitimacy. The focus on group-
sponsored advertisements is appropriate because group sponsors tend to spend more on 
attack advertising than other sponsors (Salamone, Yoesle, and Riddout 2017), and 
because group ads tend to have a bigger impact on viewers than ads sponsored by other 
agents in an election (Brooks and Murov 2012). In particular, group-sponsored ads tend 
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to reach viewers relatively universally, whereas partisan- and candidate-run ads tend to 
reach only individuals who agree with the sponsoring party. This is especially important 
to investigate after finding in the previous chapter that an overwhelming majority of 
negative ad expenditures is coming from outside political groups, which is a significant 
change following the Court’s ruling in Citizens United (see Figure 2.7).  
The following two chapters will investigate the role that negative advertising 
plays in the construction of individual-level opinions about the court. Chapter 3 will 
focus on long-term perceptions of the court that relate most directly to emotional 
reactions to the court, but also encompass beliefs and opinions related to the court that are 
more transient or open to updating. Chapter 4 will focus on long-term opinion change 
related to the institution of the court and the ability of the court system to reach 
appropriate decisions. Both chapters will rely on information derived from a laboratory 
experiment centered on real-world campaign stimuli and will demonstrate short-term and 
expected long-term effects of televised negative advertisements used during judicial 
elections.  
Theory 
 As outlined in Chapter 1, there are a number of reasons to predict that negative 
campaign advertisements in judicial elections will influence the way that individuals 
conceptualize the courts. Because the public is generally less aware of the courts than of 
other branches of government, and because the courts tend to receive less news coverage 
than other branches of government, there are relatively few opportunities for individuals 
to update their perceptions about the courts. Elections, then, create an information-rich 
environment regarding the courts—newspapers (both local and regional) often publish 
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stories related to the state’s top bench, and television carries advertisements aimed at 
explaining who the state’s justices are, and potentially, who those justices should be.  
 These advertisements can typically be classified into one of three groups: 
promotional, contrasting, and attacking. During the years considered in this dissertation, 
promote ads made up 41.6% of ad airings, while contrast ads made up 6.9%, and attack 
ads made up 51.5% of airings. (See Table 2.6 for more information.) Promotional 
advertisements, which Chapter 2 demonstrates to be the most commonly used 
advertisement classification, focus on creating a positive narrative around the candidate 
in question. This is often achieved by sharing positive historical information, discussing 
previous political gains, or sharing information about the candidate that is intended to 
make the candidate more appealing to the general public. These advertisements also often 
contain cues for conservative voters, regardless of the candidates’ ideology, such as 
stating that the candidate supports family values and wishes to keep the government from 
inappropriately intruding on citizens.  
One such promotional ad is “Law and Order 2”, which was aired on behalf of 
David Prosser in 2011 by the W.W.C. Issues Mobilization Council, Inc., an outside 
political group active in this election. The transcript and stills from the advertisement are 
available in Appendix F. The advertisement praises Prosser for his defense of children in 
the face of predators and totes his favorable coverage in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
and his endorsement by over sixty law enforcement officials in Wisconsin. The 
information in the advertisement is conveyed in such a way as to show that Wisconsin 
needs tough judges on the bench to protect children, and that Prosser, already serving as a 
judge, is that kind of judge. The advertisement uses symbolism common in judicial 
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advertisements, including a slamming cell door when discussing putting away offenders, 
as well as Judge Prosser pictured in his robes, all of which are likely to improve the 
public’s view of both Prosser and the bench itself.  
The second classification, contrasting advertisements, has some similarities to 
promotional ads but is ultimately distinct. Contrast advertising tends to identify a 
weakness in one candidate, and then contrasts that weakness with a strength in that 
candidate’s opponent. Contrast advertising covers a wide range of topics and tone for two 
reasons. First, the content of the advertisement may be more heavily positive or 
negative—if one candidate has accepted contributions from out-of-state groups and the 
other has only accepted in-state donations, the resulting ad could have a neutral or even 
positive tone. However, if a contrast ad focuses on the accusation that one candidate has 
violated the ethics norms of the state, the resulting ad is likely to have a strongly negative 
tone. The second factor that can influence the tone of contrast ads is how the 
advertisement is constructed. If the candidate airing the ad wishes to scare people, for 
example, they may use cinematic effects or pointed writing in an effort to elicit negative 
emotional responses from viewers.  
One example of a contrast advertisement is “Hiding Liberal Record”, an 
advertisement aired by the Clean Water and Air PAC, an outside political group active in 
the 2012 Louisiana Supreme Court election. The transcript and stills from this ad are 
available in Appendix F. In the advertisement the Clean Water and Air PAC attacks 
Guidry for what they call his liberal record, his use of attack ads and campaign funds, and 
specific rulings and projects from Guidry’s past. The ad juxtaposes the Clean Water and 
Air PAC’s portrayal of Guidry’s record with that of Jeff Hughes, who the PAC says has a 
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strong conservative record and is endorsed by several Republican groups. The 
advertisement airs by addressing Guidry directly, telling him that he cannot hide. The ad 
mixes components of negativity (specifically in challenging Guidry’s record of voting 
‘against gun rights’ and ‘for higher taxes’) with positive answers (in this case choosing a 
candidate who is endorsed by a party that fights for gun rights and against tax increases). 
In doing so it is possible that contrast advertisements like this can have detrimental 
effects on perceptions of the legitimacy of the bench by making the bench appear to be a 
political institution, as well as by suggesting that under-informed or ill-prepared 
candidates sometimes serve on the bench. 
The final classification used in this paper is for overtly negative advertisements—
specifically attack advertisements. These advertisements contain direct attacks on one 
candidate in a race, and their sole point is to harm the electoral chances of the candidate 
in focus, but not necessarily to redirect that fear to the candidate’s rival. One such 
example, “Sexist Slurs,” was described earlier in the chapter and is an excellent example 
of some of the charges that attack advertisements often feature. Another such example is 
“Worst,” an advertisement sponsored by Campaign for 2016, an outside political group, 
and aired in opposition to Justice Karmeier in the 2014 Illinois Supreme Court Election. 
The transcript and stills from this advertisement are available in Appendix F. The 
advertisement accuses Justice Karmeier for letting off predators, rapist, and murderers, 
and claims that Karmeier is too lenient, and too indebted to special interests, and has 
failed too many victims to be Illinois’s judge. This advertisement has the potential to be 
extremely damaging to public perceptions of judicial legitimacy because it suggests that 
judges can be bought by special interests whose desires are to see a weakened criminal 
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justice system. The advertisement ties these accusations of misbehavior to a judge who is 
currently serving on the bench, which strongly implies that the bench itself is weakened 
or delegitimized by the judges on the court. I expect these advertisements will have a 
much more direct emotional effect on viewers than contrast or promote advertisements 
due to their intended purpose of arousing emotions and damaging reputations of their 
subjects, especially because unlike in contrast advertisements, attack advertisements do 
not offer a solid reason that faith in the bench can be restored through the election of a 
new or different candidate to the bench. 
As noted above, the most common kind of advertisement used in judicial 
elections tends to be promotional advertisements, which are generally positive and 
promote qualifying traits and narratives. While these advertisements do tend to frame 
justices and the courts they serve in a positive way, there is reason to assume that they are 
not as impactful to viewers as advertisements that contain elements of negativity (Lau, 
Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). As discussed in Chapter 1, negativity tends to draw the 
attention of individuals, likely due to survival instinct—negative information is important 
to understand for individual-level safety, and so when negative information is presented 
to the brain, the brain has a tendency to focus on that negative information, and weight it 
as being important. The result is that negative information likely plays a stronger role in 
opinion formation and in informing individuals about a subject than positive 
advertisements, even when positive advertisements are being aired more frequently than 
negative advertisements.  
As a result, the influences of negativity are important to document and understand 
as they likely play a causal role in the way that individuals understand and perceive of the 
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courts. Because the courts are believed to derive their agency from popular support, the 
way that judicial campaigns function and the ways in which judicial candidates and 
groups frame judicial races and candidates could play a major role in the court’s ability to 
affect its own judgements.  
The way that negative advertisements affect individual level conceptions of 
candidates has been studied at length, and scholars have determined a number of effects, 
some potentially detrimental, caused by negative advertising. These include an increase 
in learning, decreased trust in government and potentially decreased trust in candidates 
engaged in campaigning (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007), backlash against the 
candidate espousing negativity (Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbitt 1999), changing 
feelings of voter efficacy and affecting turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994, 
Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1996, Finkel and Geer 1998), and 
potentially increasing engagement in voters and the electorate (Geer 2006).  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, a number of factors are believed to contribute to the 
way that the public perceives of the court and its legitimacy. These include individual-
level knowledge of judicial institutions (Caldeira and Gibson 1992), judicial selection 
system (Benesh 2006), perceptions of procedural justice and fairness (Tyler 1994), 
interactions with the court system as a litigant or juror (Benesh 2006), perceptions of the 
court’s rulings (Hoekstra 2003), and judicial campaigning activities including accepting 
campaign money, making speeches, and engaging in negative advertising (Gibson 2008).  
This indicates that there are a number of ways that individuals tend to evaluate 
judges when estimating their legitimacy. Most of these venues to updating individual 
level perceptions happen infrequently due to a general lack of individual level 
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interactions with the state courts and a general lack of news or other coverage of the 
courts and their activities. As previously noted, the information environment regarding 
the state courts is never tremendously rich, but it is richest during the process of judicial 
selection (Schaffner and Diascro 2007). A major contributing factor to this richness is the 
advertisements that judicial candidates and other groups air during these campaigns.  
Previous studies of the effects of judicial campaigns on appraisals of the court’s 
legitimacy have consistently found that negativity associated with judicial selection can 
depress appraisals of judicial legitimacy. Gibson (2008) finds that while the use of attack 
ads and issues of fundraising often impact impressions of the court’s specific legitimacy 
at about the same rate that they impact impressions of legislative actors. However, 
Gibson’s work is limited as his treatment of the use of negativity is a news story about a 
negative advertisement instead of the advertisement itself, and the story identifies the 
advertisement as an attack advertisement. This study uses a real advertisement from an 
actual judicial election which will boost the external validity of my study, and also 
explores the impact of contrast advertisements instead of looking exclusively at attack 
advertisements.  
 As previously discussed, judicial campaigns tend to result a richer information 
environment regarding the courts than tends to exist during other times (Schaffner and 
Diascro 2007). This is partially due to the low news coverage of the courts and their 
actors (Graber 2015), but also is believed to be due to low citizen interest in the actions of 
the courts (Benesh 2006). Campaigns challenge that equilibrium by infusing elements of 
politics and chance into the conversation, and this draws attention for a wider range of 
citizens who might be interested in politics or who are drawn by the open-ended selection 
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process. This tends to result in increased coverage of the judiciary in the news media 
(Schaffner and Diascro 2007), and this coverage is often supplemented with 
advertisements run by and against judicial actors (Hall 2014), providing ample 
opportunities for citizens to update their opinions regarding the courts.  
 As was discussed above, campaign advertisements are a key way that citizens 
receive information and update their preferences regarding judicial elections and the 
judiciary itself. As such the content of those ads is tremendously important as it is one of 
the few ways that citizens gain information about the courts. As such, the overall tone of 
campaign advertisements is likely to have far-ranging effects on the way that individuals 
see the courts. 
As discussed above, negativity in campaign advertising can have wide-ranging 
effects on the ways that individuals engage with campaigns and with the government 
generally speaking. These effects include an increase in learning, decreased trust in 
government and potentially decreased trust in candidates engaged in campaigning (Lau, 
Sigelman, and Rovner 2007), backlash against the candidate espousing negativity (Lau, 
Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbitt 1999), changing feelings of voter efficacy and affecting 
turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996, Finkel and 
Geer 1998), and potentially increasing engagement in voters and the electorate (Geer 
2006).  
 While negative advertisements in the information environment are likely to sway 
perceptions of the court, there are a number of other factors that have been tied to 
individual level perceptions of the court’s legitimacy. These include individual-level 
knowledge of judicial institutions (Caldeira and Gibson 1992), judicial selection system 
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(Benesh 2006), perceptions of procedural justice and fairness (Tyler and Johnson), 
interactions with the court system as a litigant or juror (Benesh 2006), perceptions of the 
court’s rulings (Hoekstra 2003), and judicial campaigning activities including accepting 
campaign money, making speeches, and engaging in negative advertising (Gibson 2008).  
Given the number of ways that opinions about the court can be updated during 
judicial campaigns, it is imperative to understand the impact that negativity in judicial 
campaigns has on public perceptions of the court. In this chapter I examine the way that 
negative advertisements affect individual-level perceptions of specific legitimacy. This 
legitimacy is believed to be transient in nature, and easily moved by current events. These 
forces are largely driven by whether the individual agrees with recent high-profile rulings 
or other actions of the court (Easton 1965, Gibson and Caldeira 1992). With specific 
legitimacy these individual-level opinions are driven by conceptions of the current 
makeup of the court, and not by the legitimacy of the court itself. In other words, specific 
legitimacy is about how the individual feels the court is doing its job but is not about 
whether the court should exist at all or should be changed to fit the needs of its 
constituents.  
Specific legitimacy, then, is about how well individuals feel about the court in a 
given moment. Specific legitimacy is known to change often even in a specific individual 
based on the information that is presented to them. In the case of negative advertisements, 
one would expect exposure to such advertisements to be detrimental to specific 
legitimacy. An advertisement saying that a judge is accepting contributions from special 
interests and will as a result rule in their favor is very likely to diminish their approval 
about the court, or at least about the justice themselves. The effect may be mediated 
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through a variety of lenses, including personal experiences with the justice in question, 
ideological beliefs, or knowledge, but even the appearance of a negative battle between 
candidates is likely to depress opinions about the bench.  
Hypothesis 
Because specific legitimacy is believed to be much more responsive to such 
stimuli, I expect that negative ads, especially attack ads, will result in a measurable 
depression of appraisals of specific legitimacy. Specifically, I expect to find the 
following: 
Effect of Negativity Hypothesis (1): All other factors held constant, subjects exposed to 
negative judicial campaign ads will rate the specific legitimacy of the court as 
being lower than subjects exposed to less negative ads such as promote ads.  
Data and Methods 
I have designed a unique laboratory experiment to test the effects of 
advertisement tone on diffuse legitimacy. An experiment is an excellent way to examine 
the effects of media exposure on attitude change because it isolates the mechanism of the 
change and allows a researcher to precisely determine causality by eliminating other 
factors that could have caused the change. That is to say that experiments, unlike survey 
research or other methods of inquiry, allow a researcher to narrow the scope of her 
investigation to only the specific cause and effect in question to determine whether a 
relationship exists between the two. 
In the case of judicial campaigns, many factors could come into play in moving 
appraisals of judicial legitimacy. While attack advertisements are likely to influence those 
appraisals, it would be difficult to use a survey to determine the advertisements seen by 
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individuals, as well as the number of airings of those advertisements simply due to 
imperfections in recall. It is difficult for an individual to recall the ads she has seen, let 
alone the frequency with which she has seen them. Similarly, it would be difficult to use 
a survey to determine the effects of campaign advertisements on appraisals of legitimacy 
because so many other factors may influence those appraisals, such as campaign speech, 
media coverage, conversations with friends and family, as well as many other factors. An 
experiment allows all other factors to be eliminated so that only the cause and effect are 
observed. Causality is then demonstrated through a demonstration of time-ordered effects 
(the treatment precedes the observed effect) and correlation of treatment group with a 
specific outcome.  
Investigating the effects of stimuli on appraisals of specific judicial legitimacy is 
not new. Gibson examined the way that campaign behaviors swayed appraisals of 
specific legitimacy during a state supreme court election in his 2008 study, and Hoekstra 
and LaRowe examine the influences of media coverage during nomination proceedings 
on individual-level appraisals of nominees themselves (2004). This does appear to 
indicate a consensus that experimentation can have validity in determining the effects of 
political information on opinions held about the courts.   
Dependent Variable 
In order to study the effect of negativity on appraisals of specific legitimacy, I 
have drawn Gibson and Caldeira’s 2010 index of specific legitimacy.1 The index includes 
                                               
1 One question was removed from this scale due to the fact that it is related to an 
institutional appraisal of the courts. That question is as follows: “Voting for judges is the 
most appropriate way to determine who is on the court.” 
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the following questions, for which subjects provide a ranking between 1 (I do not agree at 
all) and 5 (I agree a great deal) with the first two items scored inversely: 
• The Montana Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. 
• The Montana Supreme Court favors some groups over others. 
• The Montana Supreme Court can be trusted to make decisions that are good 
for the state as a whole. 
• The Montana Supreme Court always acts in the best interests of the citizens of 
the state. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable considered in this study is the tone of judicial 
advertisement consumed. This variable has three attributes: promote, contrast, and attack. 
Each attribute has a different level of negativity, with promote being least negative, 
contrast containing aspects of both negativity and positivity, and attack being exclusively 
negative. Information about how this variable is operationalized can be found in the 
Experimental Procedures section below.  
Control Variable 
A number of individual-level factors are believed to be responsible for shaping 
perceptions of the court’s specific legitimacy. One such factor is knowledge. While 
knowledge has a strong relationship with diffuse legitimacy, the connection between 
knowledge and appraisals of specific legitimacy is less clear. However, the relationship 
between diffuse and specific legitimacy is believed to be one in which an individual’s 
observations may in the short term cause them to lose faith in or favor with the courts, but 
eventually that individual will remember the attributes that make the court politically 
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special—i.e. that the court is impartial, institutionally situated for the work it does, and 
largely reaches appropriate decisions. This realization tends to inform individuals’ 
perceptions of the specific legitimacy of the court and results in an eventual raising of 
that individual’s appraisal of specific legitimacy (Gibson 1989). This process of 
mediating the effects of stimuli on conceptions of the court then may be informed by 
many of the same factors that inform appraisals of the court’s diffuse legitimacy, such as 
knowledge, levels of education, and income.  
Knowledge about the courts can provide a bulwark against negative information 
about the court and can therefore soften the effects of delegitimizing forces (Gibson and 
Caldeira 1992). As such, I expect that high degrees of knowledge in the court are likely to 
lessen the effects of exposure to negative campaign information on perceptions of the 
court.  
Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was run during business hours from April 11-12, 2016 in the 
School of Politics and Global Studies Experimental Lab.2 233 subjects were recruited to 
participate in the project through the Arizona State University School of Politics and 
Global Studies Experimental Lab, which connects researchers with a pool of students 
from political science classes who are required to participate in a research project for 
                                               
2 Conducting the study over the course of two days allowed me to limit history threats to 
internal validity as there is little time for other real-world events to influence subject 
responses to the stimuli. To my knowledge no world events occurred that would be likely 
to influence individuals’ perceptions of the court during these two days--the New York 
Times did not publish any articles referring to the courts, federal or state, during these 
days, though AZ Central published a three stories discussing court decisions and 
President Barak Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland, though the court 
references are not the focus of the pieces.  
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course credit. All students participated for the full experiment, virtually eliminating any 
mortality threat to internal validity. Students were required to participate in two hours of 
experiments or the completion of an alternative assignment in order to pass certain 
classes within the School of Politics and Global Studies.3 Students had the opportunity to 
participate in a number of different studies, this study included. To strengthen the internal 
validity of the study (and protect from testing threats to internal validity), the actual 
purpose of the study was not divulged to potential subjects. Instead, the study was 
advertised to the subject pool in the following way: 
Study Title: Internet Media Consumption Study 
Study Description: This study examines the effects of consuming online media on 
various voter attributes such as political knowledge. 
 The demographics of this study’s sample, outlined in Table 3.1, are quite distinct 
from U.S. demographics and the A.N.E.S.’s 2012 participants’ demographics. The 
study’s sample was much more heavily male (by about 10%), was less white and more 
Latino, household incomes skewed high, respondents preferred not to align themselves 
with the two dominant political parties, and skewed much, much younger than the 
general population. In terms of education, it is obvious that my study’s sample will be 
distinct from the general population given that 100% of the subject pool has completed 
only up to “some college.” However, because diffuse legitimacy is believed to have 
origins in the early stages of civic and cultural development, and because parents tend to 
oversee that development, a comparison of parents’ levels of education to the general 
                                               
3 Only a fraction of the courses offered by the School require lab participation; the lab 
recruits professors teaching the largest courses in the School each semester to include the 
participation requirement.  
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population may be warranted and can be found in Table 3.2. The parents of the subjects 
in this study were substantially more educated than either the general public or the 
sample used by the A.N.E.S. in 2012. This may indicate that subjects should have 
stronger than normal appraisals of the court’s diffuse legitimacy. 
 The study began with a consent agreement and was followed by a battery of 
demographic questions including gender, race, education level, a court knowledge index, 
and questions designed to better understand the subject’s previous encounters with the 
legal system. The pretest can be found in Appendix H. Subjects were then randomly 
sorted into one of three treatment groups that involved exposure to a promotional, 
contrasting, or attacking judicial campaign advertisement; these conditions act as the 
main independent variable for this experiment. This random assignment to the various 
treatment groups reduces selection threats to internal validity by assuring that attributes 
of neither the researcher nor the subject contributed to determining the treatment group of 
subjects, as well as statistical regression threats to validity based on the fact that subjects 
were not sorted based on individual characteristics.   
 Each subject then received a brief biographical vignette to provide some context 
for the advertisement. The vignette was designed to be free of ideological information 
and was designed to provide as little information about the judge in question as possible. 
In reality the vignette said little more than that the candidate for the state supreme court 
was running a campaign. All candidates with advertisements received the same vignette 
with only the name changed. The vignette reads as follows: 
 “[Candidate] is currently serving as a judge on the Montana Supreme Court. This 
year [Candidate] is up for re-election after having served on the bench for eight years. 
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(Judges in Montana are elected on a nonpartisan ballot.) [Candidate] attended a top-
ranked law school in Montana and then remained in the state where he practiced law for 
20 years before first running for judge. [Candidate] is well respected within the 
community, though some have been dissatisfied with his time on the bench.”  
 The vignette specifically identifies that each advertisement is from a Montana 
State Supreme Court election. In reality two of the advertisements used are from a 2014 
Arkansas race for the Arkansas Supreme Court.4 These two advertisements do no not 
contain any references to Arkansas, so subjects are led to believe that all three 
advertisements are from the Montana State Supreme Court election so that any influence 
that the state of the election may have on appraisals of diffuse legitimacy can be 
controlled. It should be noted that subjects from Montana or from Arkansas may have 
seen these advertisements or may remember the candidates discussed in the 
advertisements. However, 0% of the subjects in the sample report Montana or Arkansas 
as their home state. The use of real-world advertisements should boost the experiment’s 
external validity by eliminating some of the artificiality in the treatment.  
 It should be noted that a lack of local connection may impede the ability of the 
experiment to accurately gauge the effects of negativity, as some scholars find that a 
location-based connection to the courts plays an important role in legitimizing the courts 
to an individual (Cann and Yates 2008). This lack of a connection could depress 
appraisals of diffuse legitimacy in all conditions. However, the depression of those 
                                               
4 The Attack Advertisement condition features an attack ad aired against candidate Tim 
Cullen in the 2014 Arkansas Supreme Court election. The Promote Advertisement 
condition features a promotional ad for candidate Robin Wynne in the 2014 Arkansas 
Supreme Court election.  
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appraisals should be consistent for all treatment groups, and given that the purpose of the 
experiment is to observe differences among treatment groups, and given that all subjects 
enter the treatments with the same level of local attachment to the courts in the treatments 
(that is, none have a local connection to the courts), the differences in perceptions of the 
court’s legitimacy will be caused by the treatments themselves, even if the overall scores 
are lower than they might be if the subject were to be asked questions about her local 
courts.5  
 Complete transcripts of the advertisements, as well as stills of the footage, are 
available in Appendix G. These advertisements were selected for a number of reasons. 
First, they tend to follow similar lines of criticism and accolade as other state supreme 
court campaign ads aired across the country, especially in that they discuss themes of law 
and order, as well as the appropriateness of campaign contributions. Second, each of 
these ads was created and distributed by a third-party political group, and not by a 
campaign, as Chapter 2 shows that outside political groups are the largest sponsors of 
attack advertisements, and it is my intention to determine the effects of advertisements 
sponsored by outside groups. That makes these advertisements especially relevant 
because this project explores the use of negativity by group sponsors in particular. 
Finally, each of the candidates referenced in the videos is very similar demographically 
(mature white males) and professionally (extensive legal experience). These ads fit with 
the coding schema in Chapter 2, which includes identifying attack advertisements based 
on their composition of strictly negative material about a single candidate or group of 
                                               
5 Random assignment of subjects into treatment groups also helps to bolster the claim of 
causation.  
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candidates, identifying contrast advertisements as those containing negative information 
about one candidate or group of candidates while proposing that another candidate or 
group of candidates is a better alternative for the bench, and finally that promote 
advertisements are those that present only positive or promotional information about a 
candidate or group of candidates.  
 Because each subject was treated with a vignette and video, there is little reason 
for any subject to assume that they have not received treatment, thus reducing the 
likelihood of compensation, compensatory rivalry, or demoralization threats to internal 
validity. 
After watching the video, subjects were then asked to complete a questionnaire 
with 14 additional questions which are available in Appendix H. Following the 
conclusion of the post-test, subjects were asked not to discuss their experiences with their 
fellow students or with other participants from the study in an attempt to limit diffusion 
threats to internal validity. While the experiment does appear to be quite internally valid, 
indicating that the results I observe are most likely attributable to the treatments that 
subjects receive, external validity is much more difficult to replicate using laboratory 
experiments. Specifically, my experiment introduces an element of artificiality as it is 
unlikely that an individual would read a vignette before immediately viewing a campaign 
advertisement, just as it is unlikely that subjects would view judicial advertisements on a 
device that they did not own in an experimental lab. While this is unlikely to cause 
significant variations in subjects’ responses to these advertisements, it is important to 
note the distinction between the laboratory and the real world. In an effort to reduce the 
effects of artificiality subjects are treated with real advertisements from real judicial 
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campaigns, and these advertisements are viewed online, which comports with the media 
consumption habits of the subject pool (given that their age and income) (American Press 
Institute 2015).  
Results and Discussion 
Effects of Exposure to Negativity 
 The Effect of Negativity Hypothesis held that exposure to negativity would result 
in a depression of subjects’ appraisals of specific legitimacy. My expectation was that the 
impact on appraisals of specific legitimacy would be dependent on the amount of 
negative information contained within the advertisement. Specifically, I expected that 
individuals in the promote condition would appraise the court’s legitimacy as highest, the 
contrast condition second highest, and the attack condition the lowest.  
 Analyzing the treatment effects using ANOVA demonstrates that the differences 
between treatment groups is minimal and the effects observed are not entirely consistent 
with expectations (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1). The ANOVA indicates that there is no 
significant difference between treatment groups. My theoretical expectations were that 
subjects in the promote condition would, as found, rate the court’s specific legitimacy as 
highest, followed by appraisals from the contrast treatment, and with subjects from the 
attack condition returning the lowest appraisal of the court’s specific legitimacy.  
OLS analysis of the effects of the experiment (reported in Table 3.5) returns 
similar estimations of the treatment effects. OLS estimation shows no significant 
difference between treatment groups, so there the hypothesis that negativity depresses 
appraisals of specific legitimacy is not supported. Table 3.5 also includes an estimation 
controlling for subjects’ knowledge of the court, as well as an estimate of knowledge 
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interacted with the treatment effects, given the possibility that knowledge may moderate 
the effect of the negativity in the exposure. None of these models identify any statistically 
significant findings. (Though these findings were not statistically significant, a figure of 
the marginal effects of interacted variables in the OLS interaction model are available in 
Figure 3.2.) 
Conclusions 
The primary finding of this chapter is that negativity in judicial campaign 
advertisements do not appear to reduce subject appraisals of the court’s specific 
legitimacy, but the effects of negativity are inconsistent. As noted above, specific 
legitimacy is believed to be somewhat easy to move and based on the most recent 
information an individual consumes about the court, making it simpler to update a 
subject’s appraisal of specific legitimacy, a move akin to changing a policy opinion, than 
it is to change diffuse legitimacy which is more of an engrained, perhaps even ideological 
belief. This should make it much easier for subjects to update their views of the courts’ 
specific legitimacy, and as a result the differences between treatment groups generally 
fails to meet my expectations.  
One possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that while attack 
advertisements do contain more information, that information may be easy to ignore for 
individuals viewing ads due to the overwhelming negativity included; perhaps 
conceptions of diffuse legitimacy allowed individuals to immediately discount 
information suggesting that the court is corrupt, thus immediately mediating the effects of 
the negativity observed. The contrast treatment however, as is the case with most contrast 
advertisements, levels specific criticisms of the bench, and then offers a remedy for those 
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criticisms—the election of the challenger. In the case of my experimental treatments, Tim 
Cullen was attacked for being too lenient for the bench. While this is a specific criticism, 
the advertisement was overtly negative, and therefore may have been hard for subjects to 
take seriously. On the other hand, VanDyke was accused of being an out of towner and 
bowing to special interests, and the remedy is to elect Mike Wheat, who is “his own 
man.” This kind of criticism fits with many individuals’ perceptions of government—that 
is, many individuals feel that political actors are in the pockets of special interest groups. 
This may provide some footing for the advertisement within the minds of subjects. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Effects of Negativity on Perceptions of Specific Legitimacy 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapters I have demonstrated how the Supreme Court’s 2010 
campaign rulings have changed the landscape of judicial ads in subtle but important 
ways; in Chapter 3 I demonstrate that exposure to such negativity may not have the 
deleterious effects predicted in previous studies. While diffuse legitimacy appears to 
stand its ground in the face of negative campaign advertisements, specific legitimacy is 
much less stable, and is therefore likely to be much more susceptible to the effects of 
negative information included in campaign advertisements for the bench. 
Theory 
In this chapter I examine the way that negative advertisements affect individual-
level perceptions of diffuse legitimacy. There are firm distinctions between diffuse 
legitimacy and specific legitimacy (Gibson and Caldeira 1992); each form of legitimacy 
is believed to be informed by different experiences and qualities of individuals, and as a 
result it is important to consider the impact of negative advertising on both forms of 
legitimacy separately.  
Recall from Chapter 1 that diffuse legitimacy is believed to be tied largely to the 
institutional legitimacy of the court, is semi-permanent in nature, and is largely unmoved 
by current events. As mentioned above, diffuse legitimacy is believed to be made up of 
beliefs about the institutional appropriateness of the court. Diffuse legitimacy is 
persistently high and consistent, and scholars believe that this is due to the way constructs 
of diffuse legitimacy are built into individuals. Specifically, as an individual is socialized 
in American civic life they are exposed to a number of myths and images that reinforce 
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the specialness of the courts (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). These beliefs may be reinforced 
by factors in the social order that make all parties in any dispute reliant upon an impartial 
mediator—a lesson children tend to learn early in their lives (Shapiro 1981), as well as 
images such as the robes, courtrooms, and gavels that judges use to maintain order and 
preside over a case; all of these factors seem to identify the courts as an impartial and 
distinct from other branches of government that appear to be much more political and 
much less ideological.  
Conceptions of diffuse legitimacy are difficult to harm, then, because they are not 
necessarily based on the actions of the courts or on events such as political scandals that 
draw in actors of the courts. Conceptions of the courts are largely immune to information 
of this kind because the courts still appear to be such a distinct and apolitical branch 
when compared to other branches of government. Similarly, each time a justice is seen 
the public’s attention is drawn back to the symbolism and different-ness of the courts, 
and this makes it very difficult for the public to lose faith in the institution of the courts.  
Diffuse legitimacy, then, is about how confident the public is that the institution 
of the courts continues to make decisions based on the best interest of the public. Diffuse 
legitimacy is persistently strong and is therefore unlikely to be influenced to a large 
degree by judicial campaigns but given the negative and attacking nature of some 
campaigns, it is possible that appraisals of diffuse legitimacy may decline as a result of 
campaign content. In the case of negative advertisements, one would expect exposure to 
such advertisements to be marginally detrimental to appraisals of diffuse legitimacy. An 
advertisement that highlights the way that bad actors can influence the institution of the 
courts could conceivably update individuals’ overall understanding of how the courts 
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function. The effect may be mediated through a variety of lenses, including personal 
experiences with the justice in question, ideological beliefs, or knowledge, but even the 
appearance of a negative battle between candidates is likely to depress opinions about the 
bench.  
Hypothesis 
 Diffuse legitimacy is believed to be largely immobile, but because state courts are 
distinct from the Supreme Court (the court with which most citizens are familiar), and 
because opinions about state courts are likely less crystalized than opinions of the 
Supreme Court, whose origin lies in the Constitution, I expect subject appraisals of 
diffuse legitimacy to remain largely unchanged by campaign behavior. However, there is 
a strong possibility that negative ads, especially attack ads, will result in a measurable 
depression of appraisals of diffuse legitimacy. Specifically, I expect to find the following: 
Effect of Negativity Hypothesis (1): All other factors held constant, subjects exposed to 
negative judicial campaign ads will rate the diffuse legitimacy of the court as 
being lower than subjects exposed to less negative ads such as promote ads. 
Data and Methods 
To evaluate these hypotheses, will continue to analyze data from the experiment 
discussed in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 3, an experiment is an excellent way to 
examine the effects of media exposure on attitude change because it isolates the 
identified causal mechanism and allows the researcher to observe outcomes that can 
confidently be attributed to specific causes while simultaneously ruling out other 
potential causes such as contextual factors specific to a particular judicial race. For more 
details about the benefits of experimentation for exploring judicial campaigns, as well as 
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information regarding the design of the experiment, see Chapter 3 under “Data and 
Methods.”  
Experiments have been used in a number of studies to examine the effects of 
stimuli on individual-level appraisals of diffuse or institutional legitimacy (Gibson 2008, 
Scherer and Curry 2008, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005, Gibson, Gottfried, Delli 
Carpini, and Jamieson 2010), so experiments appear to be a methodologically strong 
means of measuring influences on perceptions of diffuse legitimacy. 
Dependent Variable 
To measure the dependent variable, diffuse legitimacy, I adapted Gibson and 
Caldeira’s 2010 diffuse legitimacy index, as is outlined above. The index contains five 
statements, and subjects are asked to rate how much they agree with the statement on a 
scale of 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I agree a great deal). (All items but the last item in 
the index are scored inversely so that a higher score correlates with higher appraisals of 
diffuse legitimacy.) Those items are as follows: 
• The courts’ power to declare acts of congress unconstitutional should be 
eliminated. 
• If the Montana Supreme Court continually makes decisions that the people 
disagree with, it might be better to do away with the court altogether.  
• It would not make much difference to me if the constitution were to be rewritten 
to reduce the powers of the courts.  
• The right of the Montana Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial 
issues should be limited by congress.  
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• People should be willing to do everything they can to make sure a proposal to 
abolish the Montana Supreme Court is defeated.1  
Independent Variable 
 The independent variable in this study is exposure to a negative judicial campaign 
advertisement. The variable has three attributes: exposure to a promotional 
advertisement, exposure to a contrast advertisement, and exposure to an attack 
advertisement. For more information about the independent variable, see Chapter 3 under 
“Data and Methods.” 
Control Variable 
Because of the roles of individual-level factors in shaping perceptions of the 
court’s diffuse legitimacy, also consider a number of such factors in this chapter.  
Knowledge of the courts has consistently acted to boost appraisals of the court’s 
legitimacy. Knowledge of courts tends to improve perceptions of the court’s diffuse 
legitimacy because individuals are likely to understand the institutional strictures that 
allow the court to function properly and avoid problematic influences (Gibson, Caldeira 
and Baird 1998). As such, knowledge about the courts is likely to help counteract the 
effects of negativity in the independent variable.  
 
                                               
1 It should be noted that while these measures are tested thoroughly in the political 
science literature (see Gibson and Caldeira 1992, Gibson 2008, Gibson 2009), they could 
be misleading or confusing when applied at the state court level, especially given my use 
of the word “congress” instead of “legislature”, and my failure to specify “state 
constitution” instead of “constitution.” However, contextual clues are likely to have cued 
subjects to the intent of the questions as all questions included in this scale, as well as the 
questions asked preceding and following this scale, all addressed the Montana Supreme 
Court and the candidates aiming to join or remain on that bench.  
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Experimental Procedures 
 The data for this study come from the same experiment conducted in Chapter 3. 
For more information about experimental procedures, see Chapter 3 under “Data and 
Methods.” 
Results and Discussion 
Effects of Exposure to Negativity 
 The Effect of Negativity Hypothesis holds that exposure to negativity in judicial 
campaign advertisements will result in a lower appraisal of the court’s diffuse legitimacy. 
My expectation was to find that the most negative advertisements, attack ads, would have 
the strongest negative effect, and that contrast ads, which contain both negative and 
positive information, would have a lower magnitude negative impact on appraisals of 
diffuse legitimacy. 
 Analyzing the treatment effects using ANOVA demonstrates that the differences 
between treatment groups is minimal and not statistically significant (see Table 4.1). 
Graphic representations of the difference of means between treatment groups can be 
found in Figure 4.1. OLS analysis of the treatment effects of the experiment confirms the 
finding that appraisals of diffuse support do not appear to be influenced by exposure to 
negativity in campaign advertisements in a statistically significant way (results can be 
found in Table 4.2). However, interacting knowledge with the treatment variables 
identifies a statistically significant difference in the contrast treatment group. 
Specifically, individuals in the contrast group are expected to rate the legitimacy of the 
court as 2.695 points higher than individuals in other treatment groups (p<.10). 
Additional discussion of those interaction effects can be found below.   
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Control Variable 
Knowledge of the courts appears to play a significant role in mediating the effects 
of negativity contained in judicial advertisements. OLS estimation of the experimental 
conditions controlling for subject’s knowledge of the court (on the five-point knowledge 
scale) shows that for each single-question improvement on the knowledge scale a 
subject’s appraisal of the court’s diffuse legitimacy is expected to increase by .710 
(p<.01). However, because knowledge of the courts is expected to mediate the treatment 
effect, a model interacting knowledge and treatment is appropriate for estimating the 
influence of knowledge. The interactive model, identified as Model C in Table 4.2 
indicates that significance in the contrast condition, as discussed above. Knowledge is 
also significant in this estimation, with each additional correct answer in the knowledge 
battery improving appraisals of diffuse legitimacy by 1.212 points (p<.01). Similarly, the 
interaction of the two terms is significant at p<.10. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the marginal 
effects of this interaction. Generally speaking, individuals in the contrast group rated the 
court’s diffuse legitimacy as higher than individuals in the other treatment groups. 
However, as is demonstrated in Figure 4.2, knowledge moderates this effect; as 
individuals’ knowledge of the courts increases, the legitimizing effect of the 
advertisement is diminished and reversed. In other words, an individual in the contrast 
condition with low knowledge of the court is likely to rate the court’s legitimacy as 
higher than individuals in the other conditions, but an individual in the contrast condition 
with high knowledge of the courts is likely to rate the legitimacy of the courts as lower 
than individuals in other conditions.  
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This finding is especially important, because it shows that individuals who would 
be expected to appraise the court’s legitimacy as highest (due to their knowledge of the 
courts) are the group most impacted by the contrast treatment, indicating that knowledge 
may not provide the defense against delegitimizing factors as assumed.  
Conclusions 
 The primary finding of this chapter is that negativity in judicial campaign 
advertisements has inconsistent effects. Attack advertising does not appear to cause a 
depression in conceptions of the court’s diffuse legitimacy, but contrast advertising can 
cause a depression in appraisals of the court’s diffuse legitimacy if the individual is 
highly knowledgeable about the courts. That this is the case for diffuse legitimacy and 
not specific legitimacy is especially concerning given that diffuse legitimacy is more 
closely tied to Easton’s systems theory of government—that is to say, if the court lacks 
diffuse legitimacy then it may be more likely that executives and legislatures will 
disregard the court’s orders and rulings. This indicates that contrast advertisements could 
be the most dangerous form of negativity that appear in state supreme court elections.  
 That said, there are some aspects of this study to consider. The first is that much 
of the literature on the legitimacy of the courts is based on investigations into the public’s 
perception of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not face reelection, and 
investigations into the selection process for the Supreme Court have shown that diffuse 
legitimacy is not damaged by even the roughest nomination and confirmation battles 
(Gibson 2009). Along those lines, it is possible that state courts lack much of the 
mythology and symbolism that surrounds the Supreme Court, and that state-level 
supreme courts are therefore more susceptible to changing information or may be updated 
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less frequently. If this is the case, then something like a televised ad campaign may have 
the ability to affect perceptions of diffuse legitimacy over time.  
 This is good news for watchers of the courts, who have worried over time that the 
use of negativity is increasing (as shown in Chapter 2, it does not appear to be), and have 
worried about the deleterious effects that such negativity could have on the public’s faith 
in the courts. The null findings in this chapter suggest that support for state courts is 
strong and healthy, even in the face of negativity. While contrast advertisements are the 
least common form of advertisement in judicial elections, their effects could harm the 
individuals with the highest support for the courts.  
 One final aspect of these findings that is worth consideration is the lack of 
experiences with and exposure to the courts that the subjects in this study shared. If 
diffuse legitimacy is the result of a number of observations made over time regarding the 
court and its behavior, then individuals with more life experiences may have more solid 
appraisals of the court because they have had more time to collect information. That such 
young subjects did not find the attack advertisement as delegitimizing suggests that state 
courts’ diffuse legitimacy is resistant to threats from conventional negativity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions 
Introduction 
 Judicial elections provide one of the most information-rich environments in 
regard to state courts. It is during these elections that news coverage of the courts 
increases (Schaffner and Diascro 2007), and when entire campaigns are constructed to 
disseminate information about the bench and its actors. Because the courts tend to receive 
very little attention from the public outside of elections (Graber and Dunaway 2015), 
judicial selection contests are one of the primary opportunities the public has to update 
their opinions and beliefs about the courts. Despite the importance of these contests, very 
little research has been published regarding the nature of the information environment of 
judicial selection contests, as well as the effects that they have on individual-level 
perceptions of the courts.  
 In order to address the lack of information currently available regarding the media 
environment, I conducted a content analysis to examine the nature of judicial selection 
advertisements. This analysis examined all advertisements related to judicial elections 
from 2000-2016 identifying the tones of the ads used, as well as money spent airing these 
ads, and the total number of airings for each ad. After determining the nature of judicial 
campaign advertisements, I sought to understand the individual- and competition-level 
factors that lead to the use of negative advertisements in judicial elections.  
 After measuring the use of negativity in judicial elections, I sought to better 
understand the influence that this negativity has on the public’s perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the courts. To do so I exposed subjects to different tones of judicial ads 
(attack, contrast, and promotional ads), and then measured their appraisals of different 
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manifestations of judicial legitimacy to determine whether appraisals of judicial 
legitimacy changed as a result of exposure to a specific tone of advertisement. This 
experiment demonstrated that the tone of ads that individuals see during judicial selection 
may be able to depress subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of state courts. These findings 
and their implications are explored in more detail below.  
Surveying Campaign Communications 
 One of the driving considerations for my analysis of judicial campaign 
advertisements was the idea that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 rulings regarding 
campaign finance may have strongly changed the campaign environment since the last 
investigations into judicial advertisements had been completed (Bonneau and Hall 2009, 
Hall 2016). In theory these changes could have freed groups from funding barriers that 
have kept highly interested parties (such as trade groups or unions) from contributing 
high dollar amounts to judicial elections, so following these decisions I expected to see 
an increase in spending and ads aired overall. I also expected to see an increase in overall 
spending from political groups (as opposed to other sponsors) given that their spending 
limits had been eliminated. Finally, I expected an increase in negativity in the 
information environment due to the fact that political groups could level any attack 
without the fear that the attack would harm the image of their preferred candidate.  
 Overall the number of airings of judicial ads does not appear to have been 
affected by the Court’s 2010 decisions. Following 2010 spending on televised political 
ads has tended to drop, especially when taking presidential years into consideration. For 
example, approximately $15 million was spent on televised judicial ads in 2008, but less 
than $14 million was spent in 2012, and about $12.5 million was spent in 2016. So, 
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spending on televised judicial ads, while still quite significant, does not appear to have 
risen as a result of the Court’s 2010 rulings. As one would expect, the number of airings 
of said ads has followed spending patterns and have generally speaking decreased since 
2010. 
 The second consideration, that groups are likely to spend more after 2010 is 
conditionally true. Table 5.1 demonstrates that groups appear more likely to spend on 
promotional ads following 2010 but appear to spend less on negative ads overall. The 
same pattern appears to hold for candidates. This is a surprising finding given that 
political groups have no accountability with either the public or with campaigns 
themselves, so political groups are welcome to fundraise and spend with very few 
bounds. This is especially true given the comparatively low amount of attention and 
spending that judicial selection attracts when compared to other statewide offices—that is 
to say that a spending on judicial selection campaigns may be more cost-effective than 
spending on legislative or gubernatorial campaigns because the later campaigns attract 
such a large amount of money in each election. However, it appears that overall the 
Court’s 2010 rulings have had little effect in advertising spending in judicial elections. It 
is important to note, however, that overall spending on attack ads has dropped since 
2010, falling by approximately $36,436 when all other factors are held constant. Promote 
ads, however, have seen a tremendous uptick in spending since 2010, averaging an 
additional $128,476 on promotional ads per seat.  
 What is especially interesting about this finding is that while groups are spending 
less on airing negative advertisements in judicial elections, they appear to be airing far 
more negative ads overall. Specifically, controlling for all other factors, it appears that 
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after 2010 groups are likely to air an average of 1197 attack ads more than they would 
have in pre-2010 races (see Table 2.3), and airing about 20 fewer contrast ads and 100 
fewer promote ads. In other words, the amount of money groups are using to air negative 
ads is decreasing, but the number of airings of those ads is increasing. One potential 
explanation for this is that groups have chosen to air their ads during lower cost 
commercial buys, by airing ads during less popular shows or at less popular times. 
Sponsors could rely on web distribution and news coverage of the ads to help the ads 
have their fullest effect and reach the highest number of people. Another possibility is 
that sponsors are using micro-targeting technology to air ads locally to targeted 
populations that may be able to be swayed. For example, a traditional campaign that 
hopes to maximize the viewership of an ad may want to air that ad statewide during a 
popular sporting event; this ad buy would be costly due to the popularity of the sporting 
event and the high number of impressions the ad is likely to make. However, a campaign 
may recognize that electoral victory hinges on winning one of two smaller cities in the 
state, so they may choose to air their ad in that smaller, cheaper media market which will 
result in fewer impressions overall but will also efficiently reach the most important 
voters in a given election. 
 These findings suggest that while the court’s 2010 rulings have not resulted in an 
overwhelming tide of political group spending, there are clear differences in strategies 
and resource allocation, and these changes and especially their effects on the electorate 
warrant additional scrutiny.  
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Effects of Negativity on Appraisals of Specific Legitimacy 
 Specific legitimacy is expected to be the very responsive to immediate stimuli. If 
the courts or court actors do something with which an individual disagrees, that 
individual’s perception is typically that the court has lost legitimacy on that issue, but 
generally remains the best institution to resolve disputes. In other words, specific 
legitimacy relates to the feelings of the court’s legitimacy that are based on the behaviors 
of the actors who temporarily inhabit the institution of the courts. As such, I expected that 
exposure to negativity in judicial campaign ads would result in a depression in subjects’ 
appraisals of the court’s specific legitimacy. 
 The primary finding of the experiment was that, contrary to expectations, subjects 
exposed to attack advertisements rated the court’s specific legitimacy as about the same 
as individuals in the promote condition, indicating that negative advertisements likely 
have only minimal, if any, effects on perceptions of the court’s specific legitimacy.  
Effects of Negativity on Appraisals of Diffuse Legitimacy 
 While diffuse legitimacy is believed to be a persistent belief that resists change, I 
hypothesized that diffuse legitimacy would be impacted by exposure to negativity 
because of the nature of state supreme court elections. This expectation held true, but not 
as expected. Subjects exposed to an attack advertisement rated the diffuse legitimacy of 
the courts as statistically indistinct from subjects exposed to a promote advertisement. 
However, close analysis of contrast advertisements, including an investigation into 
interactive effects of knowledge with the contrast treatment, shows that contrast 
advertisements can depress perceptions of the court’s diffuse legitimacy for individuals 
with high levels of knowledge about the court.  
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 In summary, exposure to negativity in judicial advertisements can lead to 
diminishing of perceptions of the court’s diffuse legitimacy. This effect can be mediated 
by individual level factors, as would be expected, but over time and with repeated 
exposure it is possible that these ads could have long-lasting negative effects on the way 
that the public perceives of the courts.  
Implications of Findings 
 Taken together these findings indicate that while the landscape of campaign 
advertising spending and airings of campaign ads has not changed much in recent years, 
there are some changes that could be detrimental, including a higher likelihood in groups 
of airing negative ads, and higher degrees of negative spending overall. The experiments 
discussed above demonstrate that exposure to negative ads can have detrimental effects 
on individuals’ perceptions of both the specific and diffuse legitimacy of the courts; 
while this negativity could have severe implications for the courts in the long-term, the 
effects are not large and are unlikely to threaten either the specific or the diffuse 
legitimacy of state supreme courts. While Gibson is certainly right that exposure to 
judicial campaigns can allow individuals to update their understandings of the courts and 
perhaps may ascribe legitimacy to the courts, negativity in these campaigns can have 
deleterious effects on the public’s faith in the courts themselves.  
 The long-term implications of these findings are that the courts, who are often 
seen as a mediator in politics and in recent years have become a primary battleground for 
promoting political change, may lose the very mechanism that grants them their control. 
That is to say, because courts lack the power of the pen and the power of the purse, they 
rely heavily on the public’s trust to see their orders enacted. In other words, if the courts 
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rule against a piece of legislation, for example, responsibility falls to the executive to 
enact the court’s opinion about that piece of legislation. Executives themselves can rarely 
be held directly accountable by the courts for failing to enact a judgment, but executives 
are typically loathe to reject the courts’ mandates because they believe that citizens 
would demand the enactment of the court’s decision or the resignation or termination of 
the executive. This direct enforcement is precarious, so significant attention should be 
paid to the mechanisms that could cause the public to lose faith in the courts, and it 
appears that judicial elections could be one of those mechanisms.  
Alternate Explanations for Experimental Findings 
 While I am confident about the findings of this dissertation, there are potential 
explanations for my findings outside of my intentional manipulations. These potential 
explanations include the possibility that my treatments were ineffective, that ad content 
itself mattered more than the tone of the ad, and that the ad contents may have varied too 
greatly to be carefully classified by tone.   
In this experiment, it is possible that subjects did not see the promote 
advertisement as a positive advertisement, and it is also possible that they did not see the 
contrast or attack ads as negative. The promote advertisement included a brief snippet of 
negativity in the introduction of the advertisement, stating that children should not have 
to fear pedophiles. While this negativity is not directed at the bench, it is possible that 
subjects picked up on it and responded to the implied threat in the ad—that failing to 
elect the featured judge would result in pedophiles running amuck. Similarly, while the 
contrast advertisement contained a mix of positive and negative information, the negative 
information was presented with light and upbeat music and bright colors, which may 
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have resulted in the ad failing to trigger the expected emotional reaction. In future studies 
manipulation checks should be used to assure that the treatment has had the intended 
effects on subjects; those checks were not included in this study.  
 As briefly noted above, another potential flaw in this study is the varied content of 
the advertisements included. While two of the advertisements (the promote and attack 
conditions) addressed concerns about law and order, especially as they apply to 
pedophiles, the third advertisement (the contrast condition) discussed the influence of 
special interests in the election and accused a candidate of being in the pocket of out-of-
state groups. Due to the lack of manipulation checks, it is impossible to know whether 
subjects were responding to the level of negativity or the content of the advertisements. 
Table 5.2 shows that the number of advertisements accusing individuals of being 
indebted to special interests has increased since Citizens United, potentially in an attempt 
to tap into voters’ distrust of the ruling. This may indicate that attacks on the motivations 
of judges, or the support of judicial candidates, may be more effective than ads intended 
to convince individuals that a judicial candidate will fail to protect them from criminals.  
 The varied content of these advertisements may also have generationally- or 
regionally-specific effects. For example, in states like Alabama and Arkansas where 
accusations of softness towards pedophiles are common individuals may be less 
emotionally aroused by the charge. Similarly, older generations may experience more 
negative emotions when seeing accusations of softness towards pedophiles than young 
people, whereas young people may experience more negative emotions when a candidate 
is accused of bowing to special interests.  
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 Finally, as discussed below, other factors related to negative emotional reactions 
could be at play in these findings, especially in terms of musical and visual cues, as well 
as linguistic cues. Unfortunately, it was impossible to control for all of these aspects 
while using these real-world advertisements, so these concerns should be addressed by 
future work. 
Future Directions 
 To continue to understand the effect of advertisement tone on appraisals of 
legitimacy future scholarship should include in-depth content analysis of judicial ads, 
longitudinal panel studies of citizens during judicial elections, and additional 
experimentation to narrow down the specific factors in negative ads that tend to sway 
perceptions of the court’s legitimacy. 
 While my content analysis shows a number of important trends, there are a 
number of additional factors that could influence the impact of the tone of ads. These 
factors include such things as cinematographic styles (Mutz 2007), the use of imagery 
and music (Brader 2005). It may also help to indicate whether ads include references to 
decisions made on the bench, personal scandals, and even campaign contribution 
scandals, all of which are common themes in judicial attack and contrast ads, and all of 
which would inform citizens about the legitimacy of the institution. This is especially 
important given that political groups are largely free to say anything they desire in order 
to support their preferred candidate, so understanding the nature of attacks levied in 
group sponsored ads and comparing those attacks to those featured by political parties or 
candidates, may provide a great deal of insight into the way that these elections influence 
voters’ perceptions, both short and long term.  
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 In addition to a more comprehensive look into campaign ads, a longitudinal 
examination of appraisals of both specific and diffuse legitimacy during and following 
judicial elections will help to show the lastingness of the depression negativity causes in 
appraisals of legitimacy. Both experiments included here found that exposure to some 
negativity results in a depression in appraisals legitimacy. Current legitimacy theory 
suggests that appraisals of diffuse legitimacy should be relatively resistant to something 
as small as a campaign advertisement but given that changes were observed in my sample 
additional investigation is required, and a longitudinal study would be best to show 
whether these effects persist. 
 Additional experimentation could shed light on the specific attributes of attack 
and contrast advertisements that leads subjects to appraise the courts’ legitimacy as lower 
after having seen them. These experiments could test the effect of attributes identified in 
content analyses of judicial advertisements, such as cinematography, music, and imagery, 
as well as various forms of attacks such as personal, professional, or ideological. To 
continue to explore the effect of negative advertisements on appraisals of diffuse 
legitimacy, I plan to take the following three tracks: First, I would like to do interviews 
with subjects whose answers were unexpected to determine whether there is a reason for 
the counter intuitive findings reported above. Second, I would be interested in doing a 
longitudinal panel survey spanning a supreme court election and the following months or 
years to determine whether effects of negativity in the selection process are long-term or 
transient. Finally, due to the role of personal and life experiences, I would like to include 
in the panel study a sample whose age demographics more closely match the general 
population in an effort to rule out age-related effects. 
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 To continue to explore the effect of negative advertisements on appraisals of 
specific legitimacy, I plan to take the following three tracks. First, I would like to conduct 
interviews with subjects to learn more about how they process the information presented 
in negative campaign advertisements. I am curious about how individuals process this 
information, especially given that individuals in the attack condition appear to find the 
courts just as specifically and diffusely legitimate as individuals in the promote condition. 
This finding is somewhat counterintuitive, especially when considering the effects of 
exposure to a contrast ad on perceptions of specific legitimacy.  
 Second, I would like to conduct a quasi-experiment using a longitudinal panel 
survey of respondents throughout an election cycle. To do so I would measure 
respondents’ perceptions of judicial legitimacy throughout an election cycle, and pair that 
data with a content analysis of advertisements in each respondent’s media environment to 
attempt to sort out whether long-term exposure to advertisements in the real-world have 
the same effects as I found in my experimental analysis. This would require a new 
content analysis of advertisements airing in specific markets, and I would plan to include 
not only information about the tone and topics covered in the advertisement, as is done by 
the Buying Time project, but would include new categories for ad content to reflect the 
various kinds of attacks that may be used against judges, as well as information about the 
music, imagery, and cinematic strategies used in the advertisements. This would provide 
externally valid data and add robustness to the null findings of this dissertation.  
 Finally, I would be interested in extending my experimental analysis with new 
experiments that consider the various facets of negativity. Specifically, I am interested in 
varying the amount of positive and negative information in a more controlled way, 
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controlling for the nature of the attack. Where my treatments contain negative 
information about decisions made on the job and about the judge’s right to govern in a 
specific state, the findings of the study would have stronger internal validity if I were to 
use ads that all feature the same substantive argument. I am also interested in varying 
other modes of transmitting negativity, including imagery, music (Brader 2005), camera 
angles (Mutz 2015), and narrative style. 
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Table 1.1: Judicial Selection Systems in the United States, 2017 
 First Selection Subsequent Selection 
Partisan 7 4 
Nonpartisan 15 15 
Appointment/Indirect 
Election 28 9 
Retention Election -- 19 
Notes: Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire appoint judges for life; life 
appointment is capped to age 70 in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Michigan and 
Ohio use partisan nomination followed by nonpartisan elections for both first selection 
and subsequent selection; these are all coded as nonpartisan selection. 
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Note: Parenthesis indicate the number of races. 
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Table 1.2: Campaign Spending on Ads of Various Tones 2006-2016 
 Attack Ads Contras Ads Promote Ads Negative Ads 
2006 
(41060) 21.8% 7.8% 70.4% 29.6% 
2008 
(90427) 34.1% 12.5% 53.4% 46.6% 
2010 
(45163) 26.2% 10.6% 63.2% 36.8% 
2012 
(84674) 9.0% 6.3% 84.8% 15.2% 
2014 
(52525) 24.3% 3.5% 72.1% 27.9% 
2016 
(240910) 26.8% 20.2% 52.9% 47.1% 
Note: Data from the Buying Justice campaign through the Brennan Center for Justice. 
Negative ads are equal to the sum of attack ads and contrast ads. (Airings in 
parenthesis.) 
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Table 2.1: Ad Tone Use from 2005-2016 
 Promote Contrast Attack 
Airings 277387 45739 343536 
Unique Ads 776 219 138 
Note: Data come from the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying Time project. 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Partisan Nonpartisan Retention
Figure 2.1: Number of Ads Aired by Selection System
Promote Contrast Attack
 131 
 
Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Table 2.2: Variance of Independent Variables 
Variable Attributes Promote Contrast Attack 
Incumbent 
Yes 
40.9% 
(113485) 
12.2% 
(15382) 
33.6% 
(41903) 
No 
59.1% 
(163902) 
87.8% 
(30357) 
66.4% 
(301633) 
Against 
Incumbent 
Yes 
39.1% 
(108499) 
33.1% 
(15132) 
13.2% 
(45343) 
No 
60.9% 
(168888) 
66.9% 
(30607) 
86.8% 
(298193) 
Unopposed 
Yes 
4.1% 
(11504) 
0.1% 
(62) 
1.4% 
(4875) 
No 
95.9% 
(265883) 
99.9% 
(45677) 
98.6% 
(338661) 
Presidential 
Election Year 
Yes 
55.5% 
(154062) 
64.2% 
(28895) 
91.4% 
(313826) 
No 
44.5% 
(123325) 
36.8% 
(16844) 
8.6% 
(29710) 
Partisan 
Yes 
29.9% 
(83022) 
38.3% 
(17533) 
5.8% 
(19943) 
No 
70.1% 
(194365) 
61.7% 
(28206) 
94.2% 
(323593) 
Nonpartisan 
Yes 
66.5% 
(184470 
61.7% 
(28206) 
92.9% 
(318974) 
No 
33.5% 
(92917) 
38.3% 
(17533) 
7.1% 
(24562) 
Retention 
Yes 
3.6% 
(9891) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.3% 
(4619) 
No 
96.4% 
(267492) 
100% 
(45739) 
98.7% 
(338917) 
After Citizens 
Yes 
50.3% 
(139478) 
27.9% 
(12800) 
78.9% 
(270994) 
No 
49.7% 
(137909) 
72.1% 
(32939) 
21.1% 
(72542) 
Note: Data for this study come from a combination of secretaries of state websites and 
the Brennan Center for Justice, as discussed in the text.  
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Table 2.3: Total Ad-Buy 
Spending by Number of 
Candidates for Judicial Elections 
2005-2016 
2005 0 
2006 2292406 
2007 529261 
2008 5950892 
2009 0 
2010 923605 
2011 3581460 
2012 5432198 
2013 467930 
2014 2284602 
2015 1138083 
2016 8195093 
Note: Data from “Buying Time,” 
Brennan Center 2017 
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimation of Factors Predicting the Number of Airings of Ads of 
Various Tones Sponsored by All Sponsors 
 
Attack Ad 
Airings 
Contrast Ad 
Airings 
Promote Ad 
Airings 
Negative Ad 
Airings 
Vote 
Differential 
-14.93 
(53.87) 
0.501 
(4.077) 
401.33 
(147.12) 
15.99 
(94.00) 
For Incumbent 
-1916.19* 
(1067.36) 
-5.50 
(47.12) 
158.89 
(143.43) 
-1948.53* 
(1090.68) 
Against 
Incumbent 
-1841.94* 
(1039.72) 
-19.29 
(45.12) 
307.97** 
(138.69) 
-1887.97* 
(1061.86) 
Presidential 
Election year 
944.90 
(770.11) 
30.19 
(33.83) 
59.53 
(101.50) 
1046.99 
(784.93) 
Partisan 
-1223.31 
(828.87) 
8.83 
(36.48) 
-145.64 
(109.79) 
-1245.47 
(843.71) 
Retention 
-1030.12 
(1613.10) 
-70.12 
(70.62) 
-568.03*** 
(205.74) 
-1187.78 
(1635.61) 
After Citizens 1169.73 
(785.04) 
-73.75** 
(34.52) 
150.09 
(104.98) 
1185.81 
(802.82) 
Winning 
Campaign 
-60.78 
(976.26) 
-17.24 
(43.10) 
137.05 
(130.52) 
-64.39 
(999.60) 
Intercept 
1570.53 
(1117.47) 
141.61*** 
(49.10) 
401.33*** 
(147.12) 
1677.37 
(1136.40) 
R-Squared 0.024 0.020 0.037 0.025 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.006 0.002 0.019 0.006 
F-Statistic 1.319 1.135 2.022 1.356 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
8 and 438 8 and 436 8 and 420 8 and 430 
p-value 0.232 0.338 0.043 0.214 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes 
significance at 1% or greater. 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 2.5: Ad-Buy Spending by Ad Tone by Outside Groups
Positive Contrast Attack
 138 
 
Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimation of Factors Predicting the Number of Airings of Ads of 
Various Tones Sponsored by Outside Political Groups 
 
Attack Ad 
Airings 
Contrast Ad 
Airings 
Promote Ad 
Airings 
Negative Ad 
Airings 
Vote 
Differential 
-13.57 
(53.79) 
2.17* 
(1.18) 
-1.88 
(2.61) 
20.43 
(93.35) 
For Incumbent 
-1985.09* 
(1065.83) 
-14.03 
(13.51) 
78.63 
(52.17) 
-2053.37* 
(1080.84) 
Against 
Incumbent 
-1920.86* 
(1038.23) 
-14.25 
(13.13) 
130.68** 
(50.92) 
-1989.73* 
(1052.28) 
Presidential 
Election year 
879.26 
(769.00) 
-9.45 
(9.67) 
7.91 
(37.51) 
906.75 
(776.22) 
Partisan 
-1182.16 
(827.68) 
-3.29 
(10.47) 
-84.21** 
(40.59) 
-1190.58 
(836.01) 
Retention 
-935.46 
(1610.78) 
-10.27 
20.27 
-59.51 
(74.68) 
-978.48 
(1619.35) 
After Citizens 1230.58 
(783.91) 
-20.59** 
(9.83) 
-108.04*** 
(38.55) 
1257.49 
(792.54) 
Winning 
Campaign 
-18.36 
(974.86) 
0.78 
(12.35) 
-15.18 
(47.59) 
-0.36 
(992.10) 
Intercept 
1485.99 
(1115.86) 
46.32*** 
(14.15) 
171.59*** 
(54.51) 
1523.71 
(1127.25) 
R-Squared 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.025 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 
F-Statistic 1.34 1.541 1.541 1.372 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
8 and 438 8 and 447 8 and 447 8 and 434 
p-value 0.222 0.141 0.141 0.207 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes 
significance at 1% or greater. 
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Table 2.6: Prevalence of Negative Ads in Judicial Elections from 2006-2014 
Year 
Number 
of 
Negative 
Ads 
Number 
of 
Negative 
Ad 
Airings 
Number 
of Open 
Seats 
Ad Airings 
by Open 
Seat 
Change 
in Ad 
Airings 
By 
Seat 
Number of 
Ads by 
Open Seat 
Change 
in 
Number 
of Ads 
by 
Open 
Seat 
2006 25 7008 32 219  0.78  
2007 3 1109 3 369.67 + 1.00 + 
2008 36 15500 45 344.44 — 0.80 — 
2009 2 1706 2 853.00 + 1.00 + 
2010 21 7173 32 224.16 — 0.66 — 
2011 6 5308 2 2654.00 + 3.00 + 
2012 16 4174 38 109.84 — 0.42 — 
2014 10 5708 24 237.83 + 0.42 — 
Note: Data from “Buying Time” by the Brennan Center (2017) 
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Table 2.7: Proportional Prevalence of Negative Advertisements in judicial Elections 
from 2006-2014 
Year 
Proportion of Aired 
Negative Ads 
Proportion of Number of 
Negative Ads 
2006 0.200 0.192 
2007 0.182 0.158 
2008 0.261 0.203 
2009 0.139 0.111 
2010 0.198 0.223 
2011 0.488 0.375 
2012 0.081 0.131 
2013 0 0 
2014 0.167 0.156 
Note: Data from “Buying Time” by the Brennan Center (2017) 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Data: Brennan Center Buying Justice 2017 
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Table 2.8: OLS Estimation of Factors Predicting the Number of Airings of Ads of 
Various Tones Sponsored by Candidates 
 
Attack Ad 
Airings 
Contrast Ad 
Airings 
Promote Ad 
Airings 
Negative Ad 
Airings 
Vote 
Differential 
-0.16 
(0.94) 
-0.65 
(1.46) 
-3.78 
(7.51) 
-0.82 
(1.84) 
For Incumbent 
36.31** 
(18.41) 
-21.32 
(28.86) 
30.80 
(89.92) 
15.28 
(36.25) 
Against 
Incumbent 
5.43 
(17.88) 
-59.58** 
(28.12) 
-105.40 
(85.66) 
-54.53 
(35.32) 
Presidential 
Election year 
-8.45 
(13.20) 
3.95 
(20.66) 
-60.53 
(62.53) 
-4.30 
(25.96) 
Partisan 
25.00* 
(14.32) 
-17.61 
(22.46) 
156.34** 
(67.94) 
7.36 
(28.21) 
Retention 
-10.90 
(26.48) 
-36.11 
(41.37) 
-204.64 
(124.33) 
-47.34 
(51.97) 
After Citizens -27.03** 
(13.44) 
-50.25** 
(21.07) 
-59.60 
(64.62) 
-77.01*** 
(26.47) 
Winning 
Campaign 
-29.21* 
(16.76) 
-9.33 
(26.49) 
158.77** 
(80.76) 
-39.15 
(33.27) 
Intercept 
31.58 
(19.33) 
110.23*** 
(30.34) 
282.52*** 
(91.05) 
142.04*** 
(38.11) 
R-Squared 0.029 0.029 0.053 0.033 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.012 0.012 0.036 0.016 
F-Statistic 1.73 1.68 3.02 1.93 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
8 and 456 8 and 452 8 and 431 8 and 452 
p-value 0.089 0.102 0.003 0.054 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes 
significance at 1% or greater. 
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimation of Factors Predicting the Number of Airings of Ads of 
Various Tones Sponsored by Political Parties 
 
Attack Ad 
Airings 
Contrast Ad 
Airings 
Promote Ad 
Airings 
Negative Ad 
Airings 
Vote 
Differential 
-1.14 
(2.69) 
-0.32 
(1.41) 
-2.79 
(3.93) 
-1.48 
(3.35) 
For Incumbent 
29.34 
(52.66) 
28.58 
(27.71) 
50.64 
(77.28) 
59.35 
(65.70) 
Against 
Incumbent 
69.48 
(51.30) 
53.13** 
(27.00) 
243.19*** 
(75.15) 
124.45* 
(64.00) 
Presidential 
Election year 
68.41* 
(37.91) 
33.12* 
(19.98) 
49.12 
(55.41) 
103.58** 
(47.36) 
Partisan 
-62.19 
(41.02) 
29.32 
(21.59) 
-183.58*** 
(59.94) 
-34.62 
(51.17) 
Retention 
-78.76 
(76.05) 
-22.28 
(40.07) 
-252.30** 
(114.36) 
-104.19 
(94.98) 
After Citizens -40.39 
(38.60) 
-5.91 
(20.37) 
241.91*** 
(56.33) 
-43.81 
(48.30) 
Winning 
Campaign 
-11.37 
(47.96) 
-8.43 
(25.20) 
-9.10 
(70.31) 
-20.29 
(59.75) 
Intercept 
56.23 
(55.43) 
-12.98 
(29.14) 
-18.67 
(81.25) 
41.90 
(69.08) 
R-Squared 0.023 0.021 0.096 0.027 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.006 0.004 0.080 0.010 
F-Statistic 1.337 1.218 6.036 1.58 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
8 and 454 8 and 450 8 and 453 8 and 450 
p-value 0.223 0.287 0.000 0.128 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes 
significance at 1% or greater. 
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 3 FIGURES AND TABLES 
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Table 3.1: Demographics of Sample Versus Demographics of 2012 ANES and 2016 U.S. 
Census Bureau Estimates of U.S. Population 
 This Study A.N.E.S. 2012 U.S. Census Bureau 
Gender 
Male 61.6% Male 48% Male 49.2% 
Female 38.3% Female 52% Female 50.8% 
Race 
White 53.2% White 71% White 61.3% 
Black or 
African 
American 
5.6% 
Black or 
African 
American 
12% 
Black or 
African 
American 
13.3% 
Asian 1.3% 
- 
Asian 5.7% 
Native 
Hawaiian or 
Pacific 
Islander 
0.9% 
Native 
Hawaiian 
or Pacific 
Islander 
0.2% 
Hispanic or 
Latino 19.7% 
Hispanic or 
Latino 11% 
Hispanic or 
Latino 17.8% 
Other 8.2% Other 6% Other 2.6% 
Income 
<$10,000 4.3% 
0-16th 
Percentile 17% 
Median 
Income $53,322 
$10,000-
$49,999 21.5% 
17th-33rd 
Percentile 15% 
Per Capita 
Income $29,829 
$50,000-
$99,999 
27.9% 34
th-67th 
Percentile 
37% 
- 
$100,000-
$249,999 36.5% 
68th-95th 
Percentile 27% 
$250,000+ 9.4% 
96th-100th 
Percentile 5% 
Political 
Party 
Democratic 36.5% Democratic 46% 
- Republican 27.9% Republican 39% 
Other 35.6% Other 14% 
Age 
19 25.3% < 21 5% <5 6.2% 
20-21 41.2% 22-37 28% 5-18 22.8% 
22-24 21.5% 38-53 27% 18-65 55.8% 
25-30 7.3% 54-69 28% 65+ 15.2% 
30-40 1.7% >70 12% 
- 
NA 3.0% - 
Note: The data included were collected through the American National Electorate Study’s data 
repository at electionstudies.org, and through the U.S. Census Bureau at census.gov. 
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Table 3.2: Comparing Parents’ Levels of Education in Experiment Sample to Levels of 
Education in A.N.E.S. 2012 Survey Respondents and 2016 U.S. Census Bureau 
Estimates 
This Study 
A.N.E.S. 2012 U.S. Census Bureau 
 Parent 1 Parent 2 
Some High 
School 
6.4% 6.9% 
Some 
High 
School 
2% 
High 
School 
Graduate 
or Higher 
87.6% 
High 
School 
Diploma 
15.0% 23.2% 
High 
School 
Diploma 
38% 
Bachelor’s 
Degree or 
Higher 
30.3% 
Some 
College 
16.3% 16.3% 
Some 
College 
30% 
- 
2-Year 
Degree 
4.3% 10.7% 
College 
Degree or 
Higher 
29% 
4-Year 
Degree 
33.5% 24.9% 
- 
Professional 
Degree 
18.9% 14.2% 
Doctoral 
Degree 
5.6% 2.6% 
NA - 1.3% 
Note: The data included were collected through the American National Electorate 
Study’s data repository at electionstudies.org, and through the U.S. Census Bureau at 
census.gov. 
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Court Experiences Between Sample and U.S. Population 
 This Study National Rates 
Juror 3.0% 27.0% 
Social Connections 51.9% --* 
Litigants 2.2% 5.8%** 
Victim 21.8% 24.2% 
Defendant 6.5% --*** 
Convicted 26.8% 24.4% 
Notes: For rates of jury service see DRI Center for Law and Public Policy (2012). For 
rates of litigants see Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2010). For victim rates see Morgan and 
Kena (2017). For conviction rates see Friedman (2015). *This measure is based on 
Benesh (2006); national rates of social or indirect associations with the courts have not 
been studied. **This figure indicates the proportion of U.S. citizens who become 
litigants annually, not cumulatively (Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2010). ***This 
information is not currently available due to methodological constraints (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, no date).  
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Table 3.4: Means of Specific Legitimacy Scores by Treatment Group 
 Mean Specific Legitimacy Score (S.D.) 
Promote (n=77) 13.18 (3.17) 
Contrast (n=79) 12.71 (3.59) 
Attack (n=77) 12.94 (4.14) 
Note: Data were generated by the experiment outlined in “Data and Methods” in Chapter 
3. F score: 0.887, p=.413. 
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Table 3.5: OLS Estimation of Appraisals of Specific Legitimacy by Condition 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Contrast Condition 
-0.473 
(0.337) 
-0.476 
(0.473) 
0.174 
(1.171) 
Attack Condition -0.247 (0.476) 
-0.235 
(0.476) 
0.564 
(1.171) 
Knowledge -- -0.185 
(0.200) 
0.015 
(0.319) 
Contrast*Knowledge -- -- 
-0.297 
(0.490) 
Attack*Knowledge -- -- -0.359 (0.479) 
Intercept 13.182*** 
(0.337) 
13.587*** 
(0.553) 
13.149*** 
(0.778) 
R-Squared 0.004 0.008 0.011 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.004 0.006 0.011 
F-Statistic 0.500 0.618 0.5003 
Degrees of Freedom 2 and 230 3 and 339 5 and 227 
p-value 0.607 0.604 0.776 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes significance at 
1% or greater. 
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Figure 3.2: Partial Effects of Knowledge and Experimental Condition on Specific 
Legitimacy 
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Table 4.1: Means of Diffuse Legitimacy Scores by Treatment Group 
 Mean Diffuse Legitimacy Score (S.D.) 
Promote (n=77) 15.83 (3.07) 
Contrast (n=79) 15.18 (3.23) 
Attack (n=77) 15.82 (4.15) 
Note: Data were generated by the experiment outlined in “Data and Methods” in Chapter 
3. F-score is .500, p=0.607. 
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Table 4.2: OLS Estimation of Appraisals of Diffuse Legitimacy by Condition 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Contrast Condition 
0.434 
(0.585) 
0.157 
(0.616) 
2.695* 
(1.418) 
Attack Condition 0.351 (0.589) 
0.129 
(0.616) 
1.650 
(1.417) 
Knowledge -- 0.710*** 
(0.281) 
1.212*** 
(0.387) 
Contrast*Knowledge -- -- 
-1.029* 
(0.593) 
Attack*Knowledge -- -- -0.610 (0.580) 
Intercept 19.377*** 
(0.417) 
17.794*** 
(0.673) 
16.716*** 
(0.942) 
R-Squared 0.003 0.040 0.053 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.006 0.027 0.032 
F-Statistic 0.307 3.140 2.516 
Degrees of Freedom 2 and 230 3 and 229 5 and 227 
p-value 0.736 0.026 0.031 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***denotes significance at 
1% or greater. 
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Figure 4.1: Partial Effects of Knowledge and Experimental Condition on Diffuse 
Legitimacy 
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Table 5.1: Means of Diffuse Legitimacy Scores by Treatment Group 
 
Mean Diffuse 
Legitimacy 
Score (S.D.) 
p-value 
Mean Specific 
Legitimacy 
Score (S.D.) 
p-value 
Promote 
(n=77) 19.38 (3.17) .593 15.83 (3.07) .082 
Contrast 
(n=79) 19.81 (3.59) .593 15.18 (3.23) .082 
Attack 
(n=77) 19.73 (4.14) .593 15.82 (4.15) .082 
Note: Data were generated by the experiment outlined in “Data and Methods” in 
Chapter 3. P-values were calculated using ANOVA. 
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Table 5.2: Judicial Ads Featuring Accusations of Indebtedness to Special Interests by Year 
Year Number of Ads Number of Races Ads Per Race 
2006 9 32 0.28 
2008 30 45 0.66 
2010 8 32 0.25 
2012 45 38 1.18 
2014 26 24 1.08 
2016 21 38 0.55 
Note: Data come from the Brenan Center for Justice’s Buying Time project. 
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APPENDIX F: EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISEMENTS 
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“Sexist Slurs” 
Transcript 
What did David Prosser call one of America’s most respected judges? He called her a 
“total [censored]ch.” Prosser even threatened to “destroy” her. Tell Prosser sexist slurs 
and threats of retribution have no place on our state’s highest court. 
Stills 
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project.  
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“Law and Order 2” 
Transcript 
Take a moment to look past the noise. Where would our children be without protection 
from crime? For decades Justice David Prosser has guarded kids against unspeakable 
crimes and fought to keep sexual predators locked up. Over sixty sheriffs and district 
attorneys praise Justice Prosser’s Work. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel explains, 
Justice Prosser is a capable justice who has protected families. Call Justice Prosser. 
Thank him for protecting children.  
Stills 
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project and was originally aired during the 2011 Wisconsin State Supreme Court 
election.  
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“Hiding Liberal Record” 
Transcript 
John Guidry, hiding his liberal record behind negative attack ads. Judge Jeff Hughes, 
endorsed by Republicans all over the district, even endorsed by the Louisiana Republican 
Party. Judge Jeff Hughes, the rock-solid conservative. Guidry spent thousands hiring 
hundreds of election day workers for his political machine. Guidry voted against 
individual gun rights, for higher taxes, and headed a community group that collapsed in 
scandal due to rampant mismanagement. John Guidry, you can run, but you can’t hide. 
Stills 
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project and was originally aired during the 2012 Louisiana State Supreme Court 
election. 
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“Worst” 
Transcript 
The worst of the worst. Predators abusing children. Rapists, murderers let off easily. In 
one case Judge Lloyd Karmeier gave easy bail to a woman later found guilty of 
murdering her four-year-old stepson. Karmeier gave probation instead of prison to a man 
who sexually assaulted a child and to theieves involved in the near fatal beating of an 
elderly woman. “Why so lenient” asks the News-Democrat. Karmeier, the special interest 
judge who’s failed too many crime victims. Vote no on Judge Karmeier.  
Stills 
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“Pocket Rev” (Contrast Treatment) 
Transcript 
Lawrence VanDyke IV. He’s in the pocket of out-of-state special interests. VanDyke 
moved to Montana after working for a Washington, D.C. lobbying firm that lobbies for 
corporate interest groups. He has 112 out-of-state cash donors. VanDyke can’t be fair for 
us if he’s in their pocket. Justice Mike Wheat is his own man: a decorated veteran who 
fought for his country; a prosecutor who fought crime; a fair, impartial, and experienced 
justice. Mike Wheat. 
Stills
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project.  
 183 
“Young Victims” (Attack Treatment) 
Transcript 
For young victims of sexual predators, the damage lasts a lifetime. Tim Cullen worked to 
throw out the sentence of a repeat sexual predator, arguing that child pornography was a 
victimless crime. Victimless? Tell that to the thousands of victims robbed of their 
childhood with permanent psychological and physical scars. Thankfully the court rejected 
Cullen’s argument. Call Tim Cullen. Tell him to stop claiming these are victimless 
crimes. Predators belong behind bars.  
Stills
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project.  
 188 
“Predators” (Promote Treatment) 
Transcript 
Predators who harm children shouldn’t get off on technicalities. Judge Robin Wynn is 
tough on sexual predators, refusing to allow technicalities to overturn convictions. He 
refused to grant any leniency to a man accused of raping his eight-year-old step-daughter, 
keeping him in jail for 35 years. And Wynn denied a new trial for a habitual sexual 
offender convicted of assaulting a young boy. Call Judge Wynn, tell him keep protecting 
our children with zero leniency for predators.  
Stills 
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Note: This advertisement was retrieved through the Brennan Center for Justice’s Buying 
Time project.  
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APPENDIX H: EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Consent Agreement 
 
Internet Media Consumption Study 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Hoekstra and Professor Fridkin in the 
School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. We are conducting a research 
study to see how people respond to media they consume online. I am inviting your participation, 
which will involve answering a few questions, reading a short paragraph, watching a video clip 
about a political issue, and then answering some follow-up questions. You have the right not to 
answer any question, and to stop participation at any time. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Participation today will take no more than one 
hour. If you do not wish to participate today, there is an alternative assignment available from 
your professor that involves writing a three-page essay from a chapter of a political science 
methods textbook. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, 
there will be no penalty, it will not affect your grade, and you will still receive credit for 
participating today. You must be over the age of 18 to participate in the study today. 
 
Your participation in this study has the potential to greatly improve the understanding political 
scientists have of the effect of online media consumption. You will also be exposed to the data 
collection process of political science experimentation—keep this experience in mind as you 
prepare to complete your own research projects throughout your career here. There are no 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. Your responses to today’s experiment will 
be anonymous, meaning that the data we collect cannot be traced back to you. We will not ask 
you for any identifying information.  The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations, or publications but your name will not 
be used. 
  
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact Dr. Valerie Hoekstra at: 
vrhoekstr@asu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this 
research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human 
Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and 
Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please click “I consent” to agree to these terms and begin the 
study. 
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Pre-Test 
First, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. Please answer as completely and 
honestly as you can.  
 
In what year were you born? (Text response) 
 
Please indicate your gender: 
(1) Male 
(2) Female 
 
What do you consider to be your home state? (Drop down) 
 
Are you considered an international student? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
In what year of your academic studies are you currently? 
(1) Freshman 
(2) Sophomore 
(3) Junior 
(4) Senior 
(5) Non-enrolled 
 
Please specify the race or ethnicity with which you most identify: 
(1) White 
(2) Black or African American 
(3) American Indian or Alaska Native 
(4) Asian 
(5) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
(6) Hispanic or Latino 
(7) Other 
 
Do you tend to think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or something else? 
(1) a Democrat 
(2) a Republican 
(3) something else 
 
Who currently serves as the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? (Text response) 
 
How many women currently serve on the United States Supreme Court (Drop down, options 1-9) 
 
Can the United States Supreme Court declare acts of Congress unconstitutional?  
(1) Yes 
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(2) No 
 
Does a 5-4 ruling in the United States Supreme Court case carry the same legal weight as a 6-3 
ruing would? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
During a typical day, how many hours do you spend reading, watching, or listening to political 
news? (Slider 0-24) 
 
Which of these categories best reflects your family’s annual income? 
(1) Less than $10,000 
(2) $10,000 - $49,999 
(3) $50,000 - $99,999 
(4) $100,000 - $249,999 
(5) More than $250,000 
 
Please indicate the level of education attained by your two closest parents.  
Parent 1:  
(1) Less than high school 
(2) High school graduate  
(3) Some college 
(4) 2-year degree 
(5) 4-year degree 
(6) Professional degree 
(7) Doctorate 
 
Parent 2:  
(1) Less than high school 
(2) High school graduate  
(3) Some college 
(4) 2-year degree 
(5) 4-year degree 
(6) Professional degree 
(7) Doctorate 
 
Now we would like to ask you a few questions about some of your interactions with the 
government. 
 
Have you ever served as a juror? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
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Have you ever been a litigant in a lawsuit? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
 
Have you ever been a criminal defendant? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Have you, or anyone close to you, ever been convicted of a crime? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Have you, or anyone close to you, ever been the victim of a major crime? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Has anyone you have known well served as a judge, juror, or an attorney? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Do you believe that crime rates are generally lower than, similar to, or higher than crime rates 
were five years ago? 
(1) Crime rates are lower than they were five years ago 
(2) Crime rates are similar to the crime rates five years ago 
(3) Crime rates are higher now than they were five years ago 
 
Now we would like for you to read a brief summary of an election happening in a nearby state, 
and then watch a short clip from the election. Finally, we will ask you a series of questions 
related to the material you have seen. 
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Treatment 
Vignette 
 
Treatment Video 
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Post-Test 
Now we would like to ask you some of your opinions related to this judicial election. We 
recognize that you do not have perfect information about this race, so just answer to the 
best of your ability. Please note that while some of these questions are very similar, no 
questions are repeated; please take the time to answer each question accurately.  
 
Please indicate how much trust you, yourself, have in the following actors: 
The Montana Supreme Court 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
Your own state Supreme Court 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
[Candidate] 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
[Candidate’s Opponents] 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
The United States Supreme Court 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
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Below is a list of institutions in the state of Montana. As far as the people running these 
institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some 
confidence, or hardly any confidence at all? 
The Montana State Police 
(1) A great deal of confidence 
(2) Only some confidence  
(3) Hardly any confidence at all 
 
The Montana State Elections Commission 
(1) A great deal of confidence 
(2) Only some confidence  
(3) Hardly any confidence at all 
 
The Governor 
(1) A great deal of confidence 
(2) Only some confidence  
(3) Hardly any confidence at all 
 
The Montana Legislature  
(1) A great deal of confidence 
(2) Only some confidence  
(3) Hardly any confidence at all 
 
The Montana Supreme Court 
(1) A great deal of confidence 
(2) Only some confidence  
(3) Hardly any confidence at all 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements: 
[Candidate] considers the views of all sides to an issue before making a decision. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
[Candidate] gives interested citizens an opportunity to express their views before making 
a decision.  
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
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[Candidate] has been practicing law for 20 years. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
[Candidate] makes decisions only after he has assembled all of the information relevant 
to the issue. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
[Candidate] can be counted on to make decisions in a fair way. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements: 
The court’s power to declare acts of congress unconstitutional should be eliminated. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
If the Montana Supreme Court continually makes decisions that the people disagree with, 
it might be better to do away with the court altogether. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
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It would not make much difference to me if the constitution were to be re-written so as to 
reduce the powers of the court. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
The right of the Montana Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues 
should be limited by congress.  
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
People should be willing to do everything they can to make sure a proposal to abolish the 
Montana Supreme Court is defeated. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements: 
The Montana Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
The Montana Supreme Court favors some groups over others. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
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The Montana Supreme Court can be trusted to make decisions that are good for the state 
as a whole. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
The Montana Supreme Court always acts in the best interests of the citizens of the state. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
Voting for judges is the most appropriate way to determine who is on the court. 
(1) A great deal 
(2) A lot 
(3) A moderate amount 
(4) A little 
(5) None at all 
 
If [candidate from treatment] is elected to the Montana Supreme Court, how much would 
you agree with each of these following statements?  
The Supreme Court of Montana is fair and impartial.  
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
Most of Montana Supreme Court’s decisions are fair and impartial. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
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The Montana Supreme Court is the best government body to resolve legal disputes. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
[Candidate] upholds constitutional principles. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
 
[Candidate] strictly upholds the law. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
The Montana Supreme Court works independently of the governor and the state 
legislature. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
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The Montana Supreme Court respects existing decisions.  
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
The Montana Supreme Court respects the public’s majority opinions.  
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
The Montana Supreme Court gives me and other people like me a voice. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
The Montana Supreme Court gives a voice to everyone, not just people like me. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
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The Montana Supreme Court decides cases based on the political preferences of the 
court’s actors. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
With 10 indicating that you feel very favorably, and 0 indicating that you feel very 
unfavorably, please indicate your feelings about the Montana Supreme Court. (Slider 0-
10) 
 
Some people say that it is the responsibility of judges to keep crime rates low. If 
[candidate from treatment] is elected, do you expect crime rates to increase, stay the 
same, or decrease? 
(1) Increase 
(2) Stay the same 
(3) Decrease 
 
[Candidate from treatment]’s opponents accuse him of being soft on what kind of 
criminal offenders? 
(1) Child Molesters 
(2) Murderers 
(3) Big Banks 
 
Some people say that the courts are too expensive to be used by those that need them. If 
[candidate from treatment] is elected, do you expect the court to be affordable for all, 
affordable only to some, or affordable to a very small number of people? 
(1) The court will be affordable to all 
(2) The court will be affordable only to some 
(3) The court will be affordable only to a very small number of people  
 
Some people expect judges to hold police officers accountable to legal and behavioral 
standards that protect the public. If [candidate from treatment] is elected, do you expect 
police officers to be held more accountable, less accountable, or about the same level of 
accountable than before his election? 
(1) More accountable 
(2) About the same level of accountability  
(3) Less accountable  
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Please indicate how much you agree with each of these statements. 
I think that most state court judges are trustworthy. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
I think that most state courts are legitimate bodies for resolving legal disputes. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
I think that most state courts are arranged in such a way as to make them the best possible 
option available for handling legal disputes and criminal matters. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
I think that most state court rulings are legally appropriate. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
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I think that most of the time state courts rule in a fair way. 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Somewhat agree 
(4) Neither agree nor disagree 
(5) Somewhat disagree 
(6) Disagree 
(7) Strongly disagree 
 
Do you feel that the electoral system is a positive or negative way for citizens to provide 
consent to be ruled by a court? 
(1) Extremely positive  
(2) Somewhat positive 
(3) Somewhat negative 
(4) Extremely negative  
 
If the court was found to be incapable of providing just rulings, how likely do you think a 
better body would replace the current structure?  
(1) Extremely likely 
(2) Somewhat likely 
(3) Somewhat unlikely 
(4) Extremely unlikely  
 
 
 208 
APPENDIX I: HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL 
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Dear Valerie Hoekstra: 
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